GOMUŁKA PLAN

FOR A NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS FREEZE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

by Karol Małcużyński

WESTERN PRESS AGENCY – WARSAW – 1964

The Polish Government believes that there are at the present time suitable conditions for undertaking immediate measures the implementation of which could facilitate further steps leading to a détente, to a strèngthening of security and to progress in the field of disarmament.

Basing itself on these premises the Government of the Polish People's Republic is submitting a proposal to freeze nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe. The implementation of such a proposal would be of particular significance to the security both of Poland and of all countries of this region as well as of the whole of Europe, since, while in no way affecting the existing relation of forces, it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race.

Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe. February 29, 1964

ZACHODNIA AGENCJA PRASOWA ZAP

39

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CONTENTS

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE POLISH PROPOSAL 7
The method of approach 9
Disarmament: partial and realistic solutions 10
War is an absurdity — peace a dictate of reason . . . 12
The returns of a new era 15
Why Central Europe? 18
The German problem 19
Consistent Polish efforts 23

II. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE GOMUŁKA PLAN . . . 27

III. FIRST REACTIONS AND FIRST OBJECTIONS . . . 32
General interest 33
Psychological barrage 36

IV. A PIT-FALL OR A CHANCE? 39
Signal for a frontal attack 43
Has too little interest been shown? 45
"Warnings" from Bonn 49
Bracing up the allies 52
Who speaks too eagerly reveals too much 54
Positive reactions to the Gomułka Plan 56
A chance to put inspection to the test 58
Back to MLF 60
Is 1969 a close or distant future? 61

V. PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE 63
In the NATO countries 65
Let exchanges and discussion continue 71
Reply to West Germany 73
Détente — a "dangerous illusion"? 76
Champions of the cold war 78
Have we concocted any of the Federal Republic's claims? 80
"The vital interest of a Great Power" 82
Slogans and aims 85

VI. THE DEBATE CONTINUES 89

ANNEX

Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the Freezing of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Armaments in Central Europe, 29 February 1964 93

Statement by the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr Adam Rapacki, at a Press Conference in Warsaw, 5 March 1964 96

Note from the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Government of the Polish People's Republic, 15 April 1964 99

Aide-mémoire from the Government of the Polish People's Republic to the Government of the German Federal Republic, 1 June 1964 110

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE POLISH PROPOSAL

The story of how the Polish Government's plan for a nuclear armaments freeze in Central Europe emerged and was made known cannot be said to be commonplace, but on the contrary rather unusual. Even before it was expounded and assumed the shape of a formal political document, it had become the topic of wide international discussion and considerable comment and speculation, had been the subject of numerous articles in the American, British, French, German and Scandinavian press, had acquired a number of protagonists as well as antagonists, and had been given the name of "Gomułka Plan".

The wide interest it has created reflects, of course, the topical nature and political weight of the Polish proposals and the clean hit they made on the target of an international problem which is of general interest and wide open for settlement.

The discussion which in this instance preceded the publication of the official document was made possible becauste two months earlier its essence and basic concepts were disclosed by Mr Władysław Gomułka in a speech delivered in Płock on 29 December 1963, on the occasion of the opening of the international oil pipeline linking the U.S.S.R., Poland, the G.D.R., Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

In the course of a general review of the international situation Mr Gomułka said:

> There can be no real stabilization and normalization of the situation in Central Europe, a sensitive point of contact of two great military groupings, so long as precisely this area is congested by stockpiles of conventional, rocket and, above, all, nuclear forces...

Towards the end of his speech, Mr Gomułka enumerated a series of problems demanding urgent settlement, together with a number of measures which would put a brake on the arms race and might facilitate the conclusion of a wider disarmament agreement. Paramount among these, he said, was

> to freeze nuclear armaments in Central Europe,

and he added that

> it would obviously be necessary to agree upon an adequate system of control... Poland is ready to present this proposal elaborated in concrete terms.

This was a clear declaration of the intention and purpose of the Polish Government and at the same time it expressed in a nutshell what would later come to be known as the Gomułka Plan.

The memorandum submitted on 29 February 1964 to all the European and non-European governments concerned (the full text is included in the Annex) is the working draft, giving formal shape to a proposal whose political and military sense is contained in the few words comprising its title: "On the Freezing of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Armaments in Central Europe".

The two months which elapsed between the declaration made in Płock and the day on which the memorandum was handed in Warsaw to the ambassadors of the countries concerned were spent in wide and detailed study and consultation, made both through the usual diplomatic channels and through every other means of contact, including direct talks with responsible statesmen and politicians in many countries. In addition to the normal and self-explanatory practice of consulting the governments of the countries which are members of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish foreign policy-makers thought it expedient that discussions on an informal basis were desirable also with politicians and diplomats of countries which are members of NATO. The Western press was keenly alive to all such contacts as, for instance, the talks between Mr Jaroszewicz, Polish Deputy Prime Minister, and representatives of the British Government and of the Labour Party, or the exchange of opinions between Mr Naszkowski, Deputy Foreign Minister, and the chiefs of delegations to the 18-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and later M. Couve de Murville in Paris. Also the visits of Mr Winiewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister, to the Scandinavian countries and to London were duly reported.

Although the contents of such routine diplomatic exchanges usually remain unpublished, it was anybody's guess that the Polish nuclear freeze proposal then being drafted would be one of the topics in these talks.

The present elaboration on what might be called the technical preliminaries to the Polish plan has been considered desirable because this particular feature caught the attention of several knowledgeable commentators who remarked,

with a certain shrewdness, that the very method of approach and manner of proceeding adopted by the Poles were clear indications as to the nature and intention of their initiative: the document in preparation would be a realistically conceived production, offering the maximum possibility for constructive discussion of the Polish plan which, in turn, would provide the best of prospects for its future implementation. Hence the necessity of sounding in advance the opinion of all concerned, with a view to anticipating such objections and doubts as might emerge during the period of formal exchange of views.

Considering the matter to be urgent, ripe for settlement and a major contribution to European security, the Polish Government spared no effort to create around it a favourable atmosphere and conditions most conducive to its being pressed forward.

DISARMAMENT: PARTIAL AND REALISTIC SOLUTIONS

Before we proceed to discuss the essence of the Polish proposal, and to record the argument it sparked off, we propose to offer a brief account of the origins of this new Polish initiative, the methods of proceeding adopted, and the lines of political thinking involved. Referring to the memorandum, the Danish Social-Democratic daily *Demokraten* wrote in March 1964:

> ...the Polish Government seeks indefatigably for means of easing tension in Europe.

On this occasion, almost every press agency and nearly all the leading newspapers in the world recalled Poland's earlier proposals and emphasized the sustained effort exerted by the Polish Government to devise such formulas and

political solutions as would serve the international cause by easing tension and reinforcing security in Europe.

It has been the general line of Polish foreign policy, as repeatedly stated in official declarations, and also pursued in political practice, to support every measure undertaken to improve international relations, to damp down sources and stimulants of tension, and thereby to reduce the risk and threat of new armed conflict.

General and total disarmament has always been and still is the ultimate aim, the only means of securing a world free of war. Meanwhile, we are all aware of the difficulties and obstacles which stand in the way of disarmament negotiations. Many of these hindrances are real and material, resulting from differing strategic and political concepts, from differing assessments of such factors as risk, control and security; many are due, to a certain degree, to years of accumulated ill-feelings, strong convictions and anxieties as to the nature of the potential adversary's intentions. All these issues, both material and psychological, are equally real impediments to the complex and intricate process of total disarmament. For the fact is that human history has, so far, been a record of the activities of humanity armed and fighting, while man living weaponless in a disarmed world was but a vision until recently such became an achievement desired, even though without practical precedent.

Apart from the real difficulties and problems obstructing the path to disarmament, many others are raised by people or groups of people who are in point of fact not interested in disarmament of any kind, be it general or partial. It is immaterial whether the attitude of such people or groups results from conviction that disarmament and relaxed inter-

national tension would run contrary to their interests — political, national or social — or consists in lack of faith in the reality of disarmament.

The fact remains that all the talks, negotiations and conferences held so far have been prolonged, arduous and of little effect; yet the world in which we live cannot afford to wait passively for some distant and propitious time when at long last all those interested may reach agreement upon every possible form of disarmament, control, and international co-operation. Months, and indeed years, have been spent by experts in discussing not even the plans submitted by various parties, but merely the agendas for their future discussion, in arguing over priorities in formulas, points of order and procedure to be followed at their next meeting, when their concern should have been to ensure that first steps were taken towards introducing practical disarmament measures and agreement reached on the procedure of applying systems of international control.

WAR IS AN ABSURDITY — PEACE A DICTATE OF REASON

These months and years of political stalemate have throughout the world been marked in the field of science by progress and development at an unprecedented rate, accompanied by research on, and the perfection of, new lethal weapons. Technical progress achieved over the past twenty years has not only brought man nearer to the stars in outer space; it has also provided him with rockets carrying nuclear warheads. The stock of weapons piled up over these years has assumed greater and greater proportions, in both quantity and quality, until the situation has become unparallelled in history — it is now a practical possibility to destroy all life and civilization on the globe. This state of

affairs offers a most unusual subject for scientific polemic: some experts maintain that the accumulated potential is sufficient to destroy every living creature 100 times over, while others estimate such killing power at a mere 20 times. Military jargon and the language of science have been enriched by the introduction of a new term — "over-kill" — to mark the additional power of destruction above the power strictly needed to annihilate the adversary. One point alone is not in dispute among experts: all are agreed that each of the two power blocs possesses the necessary means to wipe out all life.

Hence the first tentative warnings, which have now become more firmly worded statements, concerning the absurdity of war — the attempt to coerce an adversary into yielding to force as a means of settling international disputes. Global nuclear war has, for obvious reasons, ceased to be effective as a viable political instrument.

This has given rise to certain more or less controversial theories as to the "balance of fear" being an effective safeguard of peace and as to the possibility of fighting local wars with conventional weapons, there being a formal or tacit agreement to eliminate the use of nuclear arms. I do not propose to discuss the respective merits of these concepts since the volumes already written on the subject could easily fill more than one library or two. I shall limit myself to observing that the risk and danger of local and limited wars escalating into a full-scale nuclear conflict is now accepted by all concerned, while opinions still differ as to the measure of such risk and danger.

A general conviction is growing to the effect that continuing technical and scientific development accompanied by the nuclear armaments race not only increases the power of over-kill, but also year by year multiplies the danger of

nuclear arms becoming the possession not only of the chosen few, but of dozens or even scores of countries.

In addition to being pondered over by scientists and military leaders, nuclear war — whether triggered off by accident or technical error, miscalculation or provocation, by the hand of a madman or criminal — has become a source of inspiration for fiction and script writers, fascinated perhaps not so much by the novelty of technical means as by the immeasurable range of disaster, and by the apocalyptical vision of a world in liquidation.

And finally, a further piling up of nuclear arms far beyond what may be needed to destroy any potential enemy, and sustaining the continuing arms race, calls for a progressively increasing economic and financial effort by even the richest and most developed of world powers — an effort, the futility of which has become more and more apparent, placing an increasingly heavy burden on the countries concerned.

All these factors, into which I cannot, for reason of space, go deeper, have combined to create a situation in which in many countries and in wider and wider political circles there has been implanted a deep feeling that there is urgent need to revise the standards, the lines of political thinking, and the methods of proceeding employed so far.

Public opinion has in many countries and for a long time shown signs of concern and alarm at the awe-inspiring prospect of nuclear war. That sound social instinct which is nature's gift has rebelled against political gambling with trumps in the form of nuclear blackmail held up the sleeve, as though nothing had changed since the distant past when sternly worded-notes or ultimata were very effectively backed by calling up battalions or divisions. The scale of risk involved in a nuclear clash has necessitated revision and re-appraisal of political aims.

Politicians, thinking soberly and realistically, aware of the risks and consequences of military conflict in the nuclear age, and in no doubt as to the actual balance of power, arrived by degrees, though they often started from very different points of departure, at the conclusion that it was essential to seek new forms and criteria of international negotiation in order to solve some of the acute problems, to isolate and liquidate some of the centres of possible conflict, to reduce to a minimum the chances of war flaring up by surprise attack, by accident or error. Obviously, not all these ends could be achieved by technical means of security, such as radar early-warning stations, alarm systems and electronic computers. It was even clearer that, highly perfected as they may be, these technical arrangements required to be backed by a system of political security. Such a backing could only be obtained by putting an end to the cold war, easing tension and allaying fear and suspicion, by patient negotiation, agreement reached in common and control exerted jointly.

The award of top priority to disarmament agreements reflected the fact that they were regarded both as most urgently needed and as being effective.

THE RETURNS OF A NEW ERA

Note that precisely this wide political background added special weight and significance to the policy of peaceful co-existence which has always been the corner-stone of the Socialist bloc's foreign policy. The need for co-existence was particularly strongly emphasized in 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as being the topical necessity, imperative to our times. Based on a profound analysis of the world situation, the policy of

co-existence had a well-founded theoretical background and has since been implemented with great dynamism in political and diplomatic practice in relation to whatever issue reared its head in the international arena.

In a world situation such as has been described earlier, a situation replete with danger and fear and subject to increasing tension, the theoretical concept and practical pursuit of co-existence found a particularly productive soil, and met with widespread and powerful response throughout the world.

The trend towards easing tension and the quest for seeking realistic safeguards for peace gathered momentum. The principle of total and general disarmament formulated by the Soviet Government and submitted to the United Nations in September 1960 ceased to be a remote dream: it now became a down-to-earth programme, an international target unanimously accepted by history's most representative Parliament of Nations.

At the same time, and in view of the problems and practical difficulties which prevented immediate achievement of the goal, new ideas were evolved in many quarters involving partial disarmament plans such as were usually intended to become preliminary steps towards a broader solution.

At this point sound political thinking focussed, naturally enough, on the greatest and most imminent danger created by the nuclear arms race.

Hence the popular interest in, and the wide discussion of, various proposals for atom-free zones, including the Rapacki Plan; hence the suggestions, differing in form and procedure, on how to limit membership of the "nuclear club" and the increasingly pressing demand to put an end to nuclear arms proliferation.

The last-named demand has now found support also among

leading statesmen in the West, although there are still serious and even dangerous differences as to the manner in which the demand is being interpreted. There is, for instance, the highly controversial NATO multilateral force to be equipped with nuclear missiles — a plan launched by the United States and NATO commanders but received with very mixed feelings by many members of the Atlantic Alliance, except the German Federal Republic which unreservedly supports it. According to its initiators, the plan constitutes no infringement of the principle of nuclear non-dissemination; on the contrary, it is maintained, it would even serve this end. On the other hand, the Socialist countries, including Poland and the U.S.S.R., consider the setting-up of a nuclear multilateral force to be in flagrant opposition to that principle, a political and military step loaded with undesirable and dangerous consequences.

Leaving aside, for the time being, this controversial issue, it can be stated that in matters essential to the future of our world there do begin to appear certain tendencies, starting-points and estimates common to the leaders of the two main political and military blocs. What is more, where estimates differ or there is a lack of elements essential to mutual understanding there are now proceeding negotiations, discussion, talks and exchanges of views; a platform for understanding is being sought. This is precisely how the Moscow nuclear test ban treaty came into being, a partial but important step forward. Another and even more spectacular agreement was achieved by similar methods in the same year 1963, when a direct line of communication — the famous hot line — was established between the White House and the Kremlin; this was an event apparently of lesser importance but very significant and not to be underestimated. Such and similar considerations stimulated the making of certain other moves — equally fragmentary but favourable

in effect — unilateral or under bilateral agreement, such as the reduction of military budgets, the decision concerning a cut in the production of fissionable material for military purposes, or the ban on setting up military installations in outer space.

All these agreements, understandings and moves served, among other things, to prove the point that even limited, partial and admittedly imperfect agreements between the world powers or their allies do constitute concrete steps towards a general easing of international tension, that they have improved the atmosphere and contributed to allaying fears, misgivings and irritation; they have also cleared the field for better mutual understanding and negotiations.

WHY CENTRAL EUROPE?

In this general picture of the international situation, where to place the efforts undertaken by the Polish Government?

In the first place, the Polish Government has often expressed its conviction that polarization of most of the military forces and material potential of the world round the two nuclear super-powers, leaders of the two blocs, does not by any means cut down or nullify the role of medium states. There is room for them, as well as for even smaller countries, to make use of their opportunities in seeking new points of contact and building new platforms of understanding. They can and should make their contribution in trying to improve the atmosphere in international relations by using the skill, experience, influence or direct contacts they possess. It is also their duty to point out trouble-spots or regions where they consider the situation to be precarious and where developments may assume a dangerous trend.

Practice has shown that in this polarized world, loaded with explosive material of every kind, the role and opportunities of the lesser partners, as well as of the neutral and non-aligned nations, have by no means been eliminated; on the contrary, they seem to have even grown in stature and usefulness over the past ten years or so.

Under these circumstances, the Polish Government has concentrated its attention and effort on the possibility of reducing armaments of the most deadly type precisely in an area the most dangerously exposed to the possibility of direct and open conflict; its interest was focussed on nuclear armaments in Central Europe, the only area in the world where contact between the two main military and political blocs is direct.

Poland has understandable reasons for being interested in this region for she herself is a part of Central Europe. Referring to the Polish proposal at a press conference in Warsaw on 5 March, the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr Rapacki said that it was

> the result of consistent efforts made in Poland to put developments in Central Europe on a path leading to eased tension, disarmament and mutual security.

That the situation in Central Europe is the key to the stabilization of world peace is beyond discussion.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM

Germany is also situated in that same region, and much has been written on the causes and consequences of the present division of that country. To Poland, the division of Germany, its consequences, the policies pursued by each of the two German states, and the role they play in Europe,

are facts of considerable political significance. Therefore for many years now we have noted with concern that one of the two German states, namely the Federal Republic, has been the only country in Europe formally and publicly to question the decisions taken by the Allied Powers in Potsdam, and is the only country to make formal and public territorial claims. The size of the country, its geographical situation, its economic and technical potential, have combined to place the German Federal Republic in a key position in the political, economic and military system of Western Europe; if not yet decisive, it is in any case very influential. It can now afford to press forward its attitudes and views with growing frequency and effectiveness, striving for a factual right of veto in relation to other NATO members. The influence exercised by the Federal Republic has always and invariably consisted in obstructing — more or less successfully — any and every attempt to ease tension in this region. This policy has, recently, been summed up in a formula officially repeated on every occasion: "No partial agreements, no disarmament measures which are not linked with political steps towards German reunification". It is scarcely necessary to add that the reunification they have in mind is to be carried out by methods of their own choosing and would amount to absorption of the German Democratic Republic.

Without — intentionally — going into the intricacies of the problem, let it be said that Poland has never questioned the right of the German people to reunification and, indeed, considers it to be one of the leading and essential problems in Europe. The Polish Government has repeatedly stated its view that any realistic approach to German reunification must begin by recognition of the real situation existing in Europe, which includes recognition of the existence of two German states. We do not propose to put forward any plan

of our own for German reunification because the matter concerns primarily the Germans themselves, but undoubtedly it could not be carried through without agreement among the Great Powers and other countries directly concerned.

The plan for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe has other purposes than to offer or suggest a solution to this problem — which it neither does nor can do. Should it be maintained, however, that there is a general interdependence between the German problem and any suggested step towards disarmament or any measures towards easing tension, then the answer is: of course, they are interdependent. In a Europe sharply divided into two military blocs, armed to the teeth and watching with suspicion every move made by the other side, in a Europe in which both sides keep building up their armouries, the prospect of German reunification will remain distant and unattainable, unless it is intended to serve as a handy slogan to be brandished about whenever it is intended to prevent any improvement in the situation or to obstruct the road to relaxation.

Only on the condition referred to by Mr Rapacki, to the effect that developments in Europe should be put on "a path leading to eased tension, disarmament and mutual sceurity", only through concrete and jointly achieved understanding on reducing tension and softening the rigid line of division, and only by increasing the feeling of mutual trust and security will the prospect of German reunification assume realistic proportions.

This is our way of reasoning, and since the Polish plan is precisely a step in this direction we can claim that its implementation would become — in a general sense — of benefit to the solution of the German problem by creating conditions more favourable than they are at present.

The German Federal Government has put the cart before

the horse: first — they say — reunification, and only then easing tension and disarmament. To sober and realistic political thinking this sequence means blocking the road to any partial understanding in Central Europe and, *eo ipso*, to easing tension.

The Federal Government has succeeded in sanctioning the phrase "progress towards reunification" as something of a sacrosanct formula to cover up its negative attitude to numerous international problems. It has, of course, been introduced by the West German press into their comments on the Polish proposals, as it has invariably been used on any occasion which offered whatever vague prospects of relaxation or disarmament negotiations even with no direct bearing on Europe.

The formula even found its way into Bonn's official but scarcely enthusiastic approval of the nuclear test ban agreement signed in Moscow, and was repeated after the decision taken by the three nuclear powers to reduce production of fissionable material for military purposes.

The undoubted weight of Bonn's political influence is always used to tip the scales towards continued rigid division, mistrust, relentlessness, and unwillingness to compromise — never towards negotiation, seeking common platforms and making mutually agreed concessions. Bonn propaganda considers itself second to none in unmasking various "communist pit-falls", in detecting skillfully laid snares, and it specializes in de-coding the most secret and mysterious designs, either long-term or short, of "the Kremlin and world Communism".

But other voices are also being heard from the German Federal Republic, and the rigid and unyielding line of governmental foreign policy maintained so far has often been subject to criticism. Recently, these voices have grown in volume, indicating the fact that, in view of the change in the inter-

national situation and with increasing tendencies towards relaxation and seeking mutual understanding, the policy line reminiscent of the Adenauer era has become an anachronism leading to tension or even disputes as between allies and may, in the long run, expose the German Federal Republic to the danger of isolation.

Certainly, neither these reasonable voices nor the circles from which they are raised determine the practical policies or attitudes of the Federal Government; the discussion on how to make West German policies more elastic has not been borne out by political facts, and Chancellor Erhard's cabinet maintain in what we regard as key matters the attitude adopted by their predecessors. We shall return to this point when attempting to sum up the situation.

Under these circumstances, it is by no means surprising that the Polish people, among others, watch with keen interest the behaviour of the West German Government in its international aspects and have formed a very definite opinion and estimate of its activities. There seems to be a direct functional interdependence between cold war temperatures and the winds that blow from Bonn, between the degree of East-West tension and the specific gravity of the influence the German Federal Republic exercises within the Atlantic Alliance.

And this is yet another reason for seeking ways towards a more clement climate, relaxed tension and the possibility of coming to an understanding.

CONSISTENT POLISH EFFORTS

The idea of concentrating efforts towards disarmament on an area which is more exposed than others, and, at the same time, on the most lethal of all weapons, had been

present in all earlier Polish initiatives and proposals so drafted as to make them constructive and effective.

It was the guiding principle of the 1957 Rapacki Plan concerning the setting up of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The modified version of the initial plan, submitted in November 1958, took into account many of the objections raised against the original version during the long discussion. To put it briefly, the difference between the new and the original versions consisted in that the Plan now provided for two stages: first, a freeze of the nuclear potential present in the proposed zone, and, secondly, removal of nuclear weapons from that zone in conjunction with a reduction of conventional forces agreed upon by both parties.

The modification introduced into the initial plan, and the working out of its second version, were proof that Poland, by removing or changing such elements as had met the strongest opposition or had come up against objective difficulties, had set out to find practical and realistic means of forming a platform of understanding.

The nuclear freeze was again the principal element in the successive Polish proposal, submitted by Mr Władysław Gomułka at the 15th United Nations session in September 1962. It sketched in an understanding under which the nuclear powers would commit themselves not to deliver nuclear arms to countries not yet members of the "club", while the latter would pledge themselves not to accept any such offer.

This was perhaps the simplest manner of achieving what the now much discussed prevention of the spread of nuclear arms proposes to do. It is also a very characteristic feature of both the Polish proposals that they run parallel and strictly in step with the ever growing and forceful trends in world politics. Mr Rapacki's idea of setting up an atom-

-free zone caught the imagination of, and has since been taken up by, various politicians in different parts of the world as, for instance, by a group of Latin American countries for their own region, and — quite recently — by the President of Finland, Mr Kekkonen, for Scandinavia. It has also been practically carried out by way of the declaration making the Antarctic, mainly populated by penguins, a nuclear-free zone, and a similar declaration endorsed by the African states in Addis Abbaba on 25 May 1963 as regards their continent.

Concern over how to break the vicious circle of nuclear armaments was the motive behind a Swedish proposal, known as the Unden Plan, and of an Irish proposal submitted to the United Nations forum; in recent times a similar concern has been expressed by several leading American politicians.

In the early months of 1964, news agencies reported from Washington a meeting beween the American Secretary of State, Mr Rusk, and the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Dobrynin, who had talked for an hour on 27 February. At a news conference immediately prior to the meeting, the Secretary of State said he intended to discuss with Mr Dobrynin the possibility of making "a fresh start on particular points" he had already discussed with him and with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko. One of the problems was the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The official British attitude at the time was similar to the American.

In advancing its latest proposal, known as the Gomułka Plan, the Polish Government emphasized that it did not regard it as a substitute to the Rapacki Plan, which had lost nothing of its actuality, was still on the agenda and could, or even ought to be, the subject of further negotiation.

This was also Mr Rapacki's view expressed at his press conference:

> We continue to regard these proposals as topical. We consider, nevertheless, that — while waiting for favourable results — it would be unreasonable to stand passively by and watch the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, in a region of the world whose importance to the future of peace can scarcely be overrated.
>
> In this field, and so long as the armaments race continues unrestrained, there is no standing still. The situation changes day by day, and it changes only to deteriorate, because the chances of unforeseeable complications increase with the development of the nuclear armouries of the two sides.
>
> Without withdrawing its earlier proposals, of a more extensive nature, the Polish Government submitted — after careful study — a new suggestion more limited in scope but less complicated, and offering better chances of realization.
>
> This — in broad outline — is the origin and background of the latest Polish memorandum concerning a nuclear arms freeze in Central Europe to cover the territories of the following four states: Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic.

II. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE GOMUŁKA PLAN

Before reviewing the international discussion around it, let us first make a brief study of the essence of the Polish proposal, the full text of which is to be found in the Annex. Here I would like to draw the reader's attention to what in my opinion are the most noteworthy and characteristic elements of the plan.

Let us begin by repeating that the plan is intentionally and consciously a limited one, both as regards the area it covers and the military means with which it is concerned. It therefore belongs to the category of partial measures which may be taken in the process known as seeking "step by step solutions".

As regards the area covered, it comprises the territory of the German Federal Republic on the NATO side, and the territories of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the side of the Warsaw Pact.

Let it also be added at once that the proposed understanding should be open to any country in Europe wishing to adhere to it.

Since easing tension is its main purpose, the Polish plan does not provide, strictly speaking, for any disarmament steps but only for checking the piling up of nuclear war material in this area — as provided under the "freeze" formula.

It proposes a nuclear arms freeze, by-passing for the time being the issue of conventional armaments. Explaining this latter omission, Mr Rapacki said at his press conference that it by no means implied that we should in any way object to proposals for a reduction of conventional arms in this region. On the contrary, Poland had repeatedly endorsed this line of action and had made concrete contributions towards it in her own earlier proposals: the modified version of the Rapacki Plan provided for a reduction of conventional armaments in the second stage of its implementation. However, since it became apparent that a joint approach to these two issues tended only further to hamper matters by intensifying the reluctance of certain circles in the West, it was resolved this time to submit the nuclear arms problem only, with a view to reducing the proposal to the simplest and most easily acceptable elements.

In the field of nuclear arms, the Polish plan is again limited solely and exclusively to nuclear and thermo-nuclear missiles and does not bear on their means of delivery — that is, above all, on rockets. This again was caused by a desire to simplify the principles on which the plan is founded and to facilitate jointly agreed control. Exercising control over nuclear-carrying vehicles would undoubtedly create additional problems.

Briefly, the essence of the Polish plan consists, with a view to avoiding any increase in the nuclear armoury already stockpiled in the area, in laying down the principle of non-production in the area, of not importing from outside it, and of non-acceptance by the signatories of new nuclear missiles and atomic warheads. Thus, the stocks would be frozen at their present level.

All this indicates the underlying intention of preserving the actual balance of strength. Charges of a desire to upset

the balance, of intending to favour one side at the expense of the other, had often been directed at various earlier proposals, although in our view those charges lacked sufficient foundation. In this instance, the very wording of the freeze formula implies preservation of the existing power ratio, of the potentiality extant which, according to the opinion of military experts in the West, amounts at least to equilibrium and ought to be to the NATO countries a sufficient guarantee of security.

The proposals dealing with the system of control deserve particular attention. The Polish plan provides for the establishment of a possibly extensive system of supervision and guarantees. To keep control over the transfer of nuclear missles, the plan provides for check-points at such junctures as airports, seaports and railway junctions. It proposes control of the production of banned military material by setting up control posts at industrial establishments capable of producing fissionable material for military purposes — that is, at plants operatnig atomic piles.

The Polish memorandum proposes the setting-up of mixed control commissions representing on a parity basis the countries who are members of the two military blocs, but which could be enlarged by way of the admission of representatives of the non-aligned nations.

Details concerning the membership, structure and methods of procedure of these international organs should be settled by negotiated agreement between the parties concerned.

Intent on creating the most far-reaching system of control possible — a point which had so often caused the breakdown of earlier disarmament talks — Poland suggests making additional attempts at co-operation in this field, for instance by way of holding periodical meetings of the representatives of the two sides and exchanging observations and information

acquired through the control commissions or through any other channels.

This offers a very broad platform on which to set up and give a trial to a mechanism of international control jointly agreed upon and operated. The simpler and the more acceptable the provisions of this plan, the better the chances of its success.

At the same time, it has repeatedly been stressed by the Polish Government that doors are wide open to discussing any possible objections and working out the details of executing control, that any constructive proposals as to the ways and means of implementing the plan are welcome and will be taken under consideration. What matters is to eliminate protracted theoretical or even abstract speculation and to pass on to concrete discussion on practical steps to be taken with a view to exercising control over definite production centres within a definite time-limit.

The Polish plan takes into account even such procedural difficulties as may arise from the lack of normal diplomatic relations between the German Federal Republic and her NATO partners and the German Democratic Republic, which is both a member of the Warsaw Pact and a country situated in the zone covered by the plan. Although it is commonly known that non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic and other Western states is regarded by Poland as a regrettable attitude, contrary to the principle of realistic politics and an obstacle to any durable settlement in Europe, we nevertheless desire to facilitate the position of the countries concerned in this respect also, and at the same time to remove the pretext that has so often served the Federal Republic — that of opposing any plan in which the Democratic Republic was involved. There are various forms of concluding an inter-

national agreement, either by exchange of notes or by drawing up a document signed by all the parties concerned. All these forms have already been used in international procedure, to cite only the Moscow test ban treaty, which has been signed by the G.F.R., as well as by the G.D.R.

Regard for form and procedure should not and cannot stand in the way of matters of such importance as making this practical step forward towards easing tension and increasing security in Europe. Since points of procedure have often been used as handy pretexts for wrecking hopes of détente, every effort should be made to eliminate abuses of this kind.

These are the principal features of the Polish proposal which illustrate the intentions of the Polish Government and indicate their way of thinking and method of proceeding.

III. FIRST REACTIONS AND FIRST OBJECTIONS

We have already seen that the Gomułka Plan was the subject of a number of press commentaries even before it was finally formulated and submitted through the usual diplomatic channels; it was commented upon even while the talks, soundings and consultations were still going on.

After the presentation of the memoraidum, and particularly after the official announcement a few days later at a press conference given by Mr Rapacki to the Polish and foreign press, news of it reverberated through the world, stimulating commentaries from many quarters.

In undertaking a survey of these commentaries, we shall — of necessity — resort to abbreviated quotations, trying to group them according to subject and angle of approach.

The first series of information released by the leading news agencies contained, naturally enough, the text of the Polish proposal with the statements and explanations given by Mr Rapacki when he answered newspaper correspondents' questions. This was followed by further information of encyclopaedic nature, recalling the plans previously submitted by Poland, including the Rapacki Plan, and excerpts from Mr Gomułka's Płock speech.

But even at this early stage some of the agencies and newspapers made their first comments and gave preliminary

appraisals of the general features of the plan: quite a few of the points raised struck a note common to various countries and diferent press organs.

There was, for instance, general approval of the matter--of-fact and sound method employed by Polish diplomacy in preparing the plan; the contacts established, soundings made and talks held while the text was being drafted were enumerated.

Secondly, there was general appraisal of the new proposal as being purposefully and deliberately limited, with a view to increasing its chances of realization: the adjective "realistic" was freely used.

Thirdly, it was pointed out that the Gomułka Plan upheld the principle of non-interference with the "balance of power", which, on the contrary, would be consolidated by the "freeze". This in itself, it was said, removed some of the previously raised objections.

And fourthly, great emphasis was laid on the fact that the Polish proposal urged the need of setting up effective international control machinery, while it left room for manoeuvre in negotiations on the final arrangements, procedure, membership, etc.

GENERAL INTEREST

As early as 5 February 1964 — that is, in the opening stage of preparatory consultations — *The Evening Star* and *The New York Post* in the United States carried a commentary by Max Freedman whose article was simultaneously reprinted in a number of other American newspapers. Here are some of his points:

...a proposal by Poland, not yet submitted to the experts at Geneva, has already aroused considerable interest in various capitals, including Washington and London...

Poland deserves credit for the way it has brought its idea to world attention. It has avoided anything which bears even a remote resemblance to a propaganda campaign. It has invited Western governments to make suggestions that will improve the plan. Poland does not intend to submit its proposal to the Geneva Conference until it is assured that it has a generous measure of support. This highly responsible conduct explains the cordial welcome which the plan has received, even while Western diplomats are studying the proposal with caution and with no commitments...

Poland has its own tradition on disarmament, and its latest proposal confirms its willingness to think for itself about European security...

The entire movement toward a truce in the cold war rests on the assumption, accepted in Moscow as in Washington, that a rough balance now exists in Europe. The Polish project would perpetuate that balance by freezing the present levels of nuclear strength...

[Poland] adds that it is easier to make certain that no new weapons are brought into Central Europe than it is to negotiate a complicated agreement on delivery systems as now proposed by the United States.

Sometimes it is said that America wants control without disarmament and Russia wants disarmament without control. Poland has suggested a system of control over armaments by a freeze on new weapons. On deeper study its proposal may be seen to contain hidden dangers that outweigh its apparent advantages. But the plan, seriously conceived in the interests of peace, deserves careful and constructive examination by Western statesmen.

The Times of London on 4 February wrote in an editorial on the Geneva disarmament conference:

The regional problem in Europe offers a good way to begin. Both sides accept the principle of control posts against surprise attack.

And, after commenting on the differences between the points of view of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., *The Times* went on:

> The suggestion by the Poles of a nuclear freeze in Central Europe as a first step is more promising... Central Europe is important as the instable centre of the line between east and west. The west ought to accept, as part of an agreement on control posts, the limitation to present levels of the weapons which could be used in the area as well as of the forces actually stationed there.

Thus, by suggesting a freeze of the whole military potential, nuclear and non-nuclear, the London paper carried the point even further than the Polish plan. What interests us for the moment is that *The Times* perceived the possibility of making use of the control posts provided under the Polish plan for other international measures — for instance, in an agreement against surprise attack. Similar suggestions have been made by other commentators.

Sydney Gruson, London correspondent of *The New York Times* (8—9 February), reported the Polish consultations in London and the Scandinavian countries, adding:

> According to reliable sources, both the United States and Britain are interested,

but he foresaw the objections that would be raised by the West German Government. He ended his dispatch with the following interesting statement:

> Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has contended that the West has a tactical superiority in central Europe as well as an overall strategic nuclear superiority.
>
> If Mr McNamara's analysis is correct, some voices here are saying, why not freeze this superiority in a strategically vital area of confrontation between East and West?

Several days later (13 February), Reuter's correspondent in Oslo gave an extensive account of Mr Winiewicz's visit to the Scandinavian capitals, while the Paris correspondent of UPI reported the talk Mr Naszkowski had had with M. Couve de Murville. It was expected, he said, that the Polish plan would be one of the topics discussed by President de Gaulle with Chancellor Erhard.

The *Frankfurter Rundschau* of 14 February, in a dispatch referring to the "activity" displayed by Poland, quoted the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter* as saying that London and Washington had

> reacted favourably but had expressed doubt whether the Federal Republic would accept the new plan.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRAGE

At that time, considerable space was given by the West German press to the effort of Polish diplomacy, the general attitude — with only few exceptions — being that of a foregone conclusion: the Polish plan would be as unacceptable as had been the earlier proposals. The customary proceeding of pointing out "snares" and uncoverning the "real intension" of the proposal was resorted to even before the proposal had been finally formulated. As was expected, many papers repeated the formula as regards Bonn of necessity opposing any regional settlement which did not advance the matter of German reunification.

Briefly, West German propaganda reacted sharply by opening a kind of psychological barrage, all the more violent because it was being reported from various Western capitals that the preliminary steps taken by Poland had aroused interest and were being welcomed.

For instance, the West Berlin *Der Tagesspiegel* of 14 February produced some behind-the-scenes information on the Polish plan:

> ...strong objections are being raised on the German side against the new Polish plan. It is possible to recognize that in point of fact what one has to deal with is a combination of two old Soviet proposals: transformation of the Baltic into a "northern peace sea", as the Soviets call it, and the setting up of a special armament limitation and control area in Central Europe, which on the Western side would include only the Federal Republic... The Federal Government has always opposed taking special arms-limitation and arms-control measures in Europe, or in a part of Europe, unless they are linked with progres towards reunification.

The same formula, with its reference to Bonn, was repeated on that same day by *Der Mittag,* and later on by scores of other newspapers — *ad infinitum.*

The Norwegian Social People's Party weekly *Orientering* on 16 February gave the following summing-up of the West German attitude in an article by the party leader, Mr Knut Loefnes:

> American commentators have already foreseen that trouble is to be expected from Bonn. The West German Government which places so much stress on the creation of multilateral nuclear forces is worried by the fact that the "freeze" suggested by the Poles would bar the Germans' way to placing their finger on the atomic trigger. There is reason to fear that West Germany will once again force its allies to turn down this proposal. The Germans will argue that the Polish proposal amounts to "discrimination" against West Germany.

On 27 February — that is, before the Polish memorandum was handed over in Warsaw to the ambassadors of the countries concerned — the Munich *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported a meeting of the CDU praesidium held under the

chairmanship of Herr Dufhues, the party business chairman. The Polish proposal was one of the items on the agenda. After the discussion which followed Chancellor Erhard's lengthy report on the international situation, the CDU praesidium voted the rejection of the Polish proposal. The paper added that this would be the attitude adopted not by the CDU only, but also by the Bonn authorities.

In this manner a quite extraordinary precedent was set up by the party which decides about the policies pursued by the Federal Government on a matter of international politics: a binding decision — and a negative one — was taken concerning a serious diplomatic proposal a few days b e f o r e that proposal had been received. (The Polish memorandum was handed to the Federal Government by way of their Embassy in New Delhi).

IV. A PIT-FALL OR A CHANCE?

After the official handing over and publication of the Polish memorandum, discussion over it in the world press developed apace. As was to be expected, at this early stage no comment either on the merits of the proposal or on the attitudes of the countries concerned came from governmental quarters; official spokesmen refrained from comment other than the usual formula to the effect that the plan was being studied and pondered over by experts.

There was, however, a variety of nuances even in these cautious statements.

The American Secretary of State, Mr Rusk, asked at a press conference on 6 March 1964 as to his attitude to the Polish proposal, said that he saw "some difficulties with them", but did not want to be categorical until he had "a chance to go over them fully with others a little more directly involved".

A similar, but even more illuminating, reply was given on 25 March by Mr William Foster, leader of the American delegation to the Geneva conference. He said that he was acquainted with the plan, that it was being studied with due attention and interest, but that — in his view — America's allies would find in it several essential snags of greater importance to them than to the United States. He added that

the result of the studies proceeding was difficult to foretell, and that the only thing he could say was that, since the plan constituted an interesting initiative, it was receiving serious attention.

A noteworthy statement was made by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr Paul Martin, who said at the Geneva conference on 26 March that his country welcomed "every sincere effort made by any nation represented at this table, to find solutions to the problems of how to begin disarmament". After declaring that the Polish plan was being studied and that there were certain objections, Mr Martin added that "some elements of that proposal are worthy of further study in [the Geneva] Committee with a view to finding a combination of measures preliminary to disarmament which would be acceptable to both sides as mutually advantageous".

An Agence France Presse report from Geneva at the beginning of March informed that a reference to the Polish plan made in his speech by Mr Naszkowski was said by a British delegation spokesman to be very interesting. And *The Times* wrote on 2 March that the preliminary soundings made by Polish diplomants

> ...appear to have received considerable encouragement from the Scandinavian countries as well as from the Afro-Asian group. Reactions in the west are said to have ranged from approval to keen and sympathetic interest.

Acording to the London correspondent of the Warsaw *Trybuna Ludu*, it was thought in circles close to the Foreign Office that in the natural course of events the Polish plan would be subject to consultations within NATO, and further it was expected that the new proposal might receive a more favourable reception in the West than that given to its more

extensive predecessor which had suggested the setting up of a nuclear-free zone. *The Guardian* of 3 March said

> there is real... sympathy in the West for Poland's efforts to produce positive results.

In reviewing the first reactions to the Polish proposal it will perhaps not be amiss to note the effect of the declarations made by Mr Harold Wilson, then on a visit to the United States.

The British Labour Party leader had repeatedly expressed his support for the idea of setting up a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe — a measure forming part of the Labour Party's introductory programme for disarmament and the lessening of tension in Europe. It was, therefore, not surprising that he should give his support also to the new Polish proposal, which worked towards this same end and was highly negotiable, although it had slightly more limited ambitions. Mr Wilson fulfilled these expectations when, at a press conference in Washington, he confirmed his Party's support for the Polish plan of freezing nuclear armaments in Central Europe.

Among other interesting statements made by Mr Wilson on that occasion, the *Trybuna Ludu* correspondent in Washington reported the following on 4 March 1964: the Labour Party leader vigorously opposed the NATO multilateral nuclear force, and he was against nuclear proliferation, and specifically against conferring nuclear power on Germany.

Mr Wilson explained that, should the Labour Party become convinced that the multilateral force was — as some would have it — the only way to prevent Germany from becoming a nuclear power, then they would reluctantly accept that alternative. As things were, far from sharing

this view, the Labour Party feared that participation in the multilateral force would rather whet than satisfy the German appetite for nuclear arms. Another danger of the multilateral force, as Mr Wilson saw it, was that it might facilitate the creation of a European nuclear deterrent independent of the U.S.A., and that would amount not only to further nuclear dissemination but would moreover split the alliance down the middle. Since the Western world was not short of nuclear arms or of means for their delivery, there could be no military justification for pressing on with the multilateral force proposal.

Asked by a CBS correspondent, Stephen E. Banker, why he so vigorously opposed the idea of conferring nuclear arms on Germany, Mr Wilson said that he had nothing against the German Federal Republic as such, but thought that such a step would be likely to take the Atlantic alliance past the point of no return in attempts to organize with the U.S.S.R. an easing of tension in Europe.

This brief summing-up of the first reactions to the Polish proposal shows them to have been dominated by keen and sympathetic interest in, and appreciation of, the sincere effort made by the Polish Government. The plan itself was considered to be carefuly balanced, and successful in dealing with most of the earlier difficulties and objections. The stress laid on the need for international control, and the possibility of discussing the form it would assume, were duly appreciated. Should this plan succeed, the possibility was recognized of taking advantage of the experience gained in this field for other disarmament measures now under discussion. In view of the generally prevailing trend towards armament limitation, towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and towards making another, however limited, step forward in East-West relations, it was believed that the Polish initiative created possibilities of finding a way out of

the deadlock that loomed over Geneva. Yet, at the same time, official and unofficial voices drew attention to the difficulties foreseen — namely the complication in the multilateral force situation and the prejudiced and generally unfavourable attitude of the German Federal Republic. On all hands accusative fingers pointed to the main and intransigent opponent to any new détente entreprise.

The tone and sense of press commentaries and even of the cautious semi-official statements could not fail to seem too inclined to yield to the No. 1 objector, and his own preventive propaganda barrage to be insufficient. This situation called for a more vigorous attack on the attractive Polish proposal.

SIGNAL FOR A FRONTAL ATTACK

Already on 6 March 1964, in a dispatch from Bonn, the Agence France Presse informed that "the plan is being carefully studied by the Federal Government" which had, as yet, declined to make any official comment upon it. The AFP went on to enumerate the following objections likely to be raised by Bonn:

> Well-informed circles recall that the Federal Government continues to oppose any settlement that would involve discrimination against Germany... the Federal Government is still convinced that all measures tending to ease international tension should, if they are to be effective, be accompanied by progress towards resolving the problem of divided Gemany.

But soon after, the tone became sharper, with a note of arrogance, all too often heard from these quarters. The signal for this change was given by none other than ex--Chancellor Adenauer, formally retired but politically as

active as ever, and as ever indefatigable in trying to wreck every prospect of understanding between East and West.

A dispatch from Bonn in *Le Monde*, dated 7 March, declared:

> In the absence of any official reaction to the Polish memorandum on a nuclear arms freeze in Central Europe, ex-Chancellor Adenauer, entertained to luncheon by foreign journalists last Thursday, gave them a foretaste of the opinion on the new Rapacki Plan which will without doubt be that of the CDU right wing.
>
> Speaking of British politics, the ex-Chancellor, as fit as ever, attacked with great virulence the proposals for neutralizing Germany, of which the Labour Party leader had made himself a protagonist: "I tell you in all earnestness, and with all the insistence possible, that I am convinced that never in Germany will there be any government to accept degradation to the rank of a third- or fourth-class people". Herr Adenauer recalled that he had fought Nazism and that Germany had been liberated from Nazi servitude. That was one more reason for her not to accept a control system which would amount to a new "slavery". The ex-Chancellor then invited Mr Wilson to ask himself how his speeches had rung in the ears of Mr Khrushchev and insisted that Mr Wilson "has rendered his country an ill-service".

The above report by *Le Monde* is worth remembering for several reasons. Not only because of the extraordinary lesson Dr Adenauer read Mr Wilson on how to serve British interests and care for the advantage of the British people, nor of the provocative remark concerning the alleged intention to degrade Germany to the rank of a third- or fourth--rate people. The particularly interesting thing is that what the ex-Chancellor attacked as a new form of "slavery" (to be compared with the Nazi servitude!) was no more than a still unspecified form of international control of disarmament.

This was indeed something new, for we had hitherto often heard the West charge the East with refusing to accept the

principle of international control — a charge which, by the way, could hardly be sustained since opinions had differed as to the form of control and as to the interdependence as between the disarmament and control issues. Now, Herr Adenauer apparently regarded a mere suggestion for the inspection of the territory of the Federal Republic (disregarding the fact that such would be extended to several other countries) as a threat of slavery and national degradation.

The ageing ex-Chancellor may have allowed himself to be carried away by the spate of his own political rhetoric, but the red light he signalled was understood. From then on, the campaign against the Polish proposal mounted by the German press, and probably by other media, too, has been gathering momentum.

HAS TOO LITTLE INTEREST BEEN SHOWN?

The AFP on 6 March reported from well-informed London circles that

> no regional security plan can be accepted without the assent of those mainly concerned and, in particular, of the German Federal Republic.

News agency dispatches from Washington informed that Mr Wilson's statements, particularly those referring to the Polish plan, were received with open hostility by West German diplomats in the U.S. capital and at the United Nations. It was believed that Dr Adenauer's attack on Mr Wilson might well affect the wording of American comments on the Polish plan.

The Italian *Il Messagero* reported from Bonn on 7 March:

> German public opinion is clearly ill-disposed to the Polish initiative... leading newspapers in the Federal Republic are devoting editorials to this matter, generally negative in tone.

The method employed on this occasion by the West German press was rather odd: the lengthy and very numerous editorials, negative in tone, appeared alongside information intended to create the impression that the Polish plan had failed to rouse much interest in the world. On the day when the *New York Herald Tribune, The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* — not to mention papers of lesser weight — printed front-page information and comments on the Polish memorandum and Mr Rapacki's press conference, when *The New York Times* found space on its front page not only for its Warsaw correspondent's report, but also for a feature on the Polish Foreign Minister in its "Man in the News" column and a map of the area covered by the plan on one of its further pages — on that very day the *Deutsche Zeitung mit Wirtschaftszeitung* published a correspondence from the United States headlined: "Little Interest for the Rapacki Plan", while the *Frankfurter Rundschau* carried the title: "Sceptical Reception of the Gomulka Plan".

Commentators in a number of leading West German newspapers foretold with great authority that the Polish plan would have no chances of success. *Die Welt* charged on 6 March that the plan had been levelled at the NATO multilateral force, and said:

> But this is not the only reason why it will have no prospect of being seriously discussed... Purely military considerations are again the source of these plans, which are not linked with political progress No far-reaching, regionally limited, disarmament measures can be taken in such a manner as to by-pass the origin of tension in Central Europe — the division of Germany. Since

Rapacki had omitted this question, his most recent proposal will share the fate of his earlier plans.

Voices in the West German press representing a more matter-of-fact and objective approach to the Polish memorandum were, unfortunately, few and far between. One of these exceptions was H. Stehle's article in *Die Zeit* of 13 March. Herr Stehle maintained that the Polish proposal had certain positive aspects, and had been drafted so as to enable NATO to take it under consideration. He warned against repetition of the 1958 situation when the Bonn Foreign Ministry merely sent a formal acknowledgement of the Polish proposals and then let them be pulled to pieces in polemics.

Another article, remarkable for its objectivity, appeared in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* of 10 April. Arnold Künzli wrote:

It would be an experiment... to contribute to the implementation of the new Polish arms freeze plan which was submitted by Warsaw in early March and which has since been dubbed the "Gomulka Plan". This plan deserves a better fate than to be put on ice in the election year 1964, in which high diplomacy has been largely condemned to immobilization. It must be seen to it in any case that the plan should remain a topic of discussion until a more propitious time...

The Poles believe that such a relatively limited programme offers the additional advantage of relatively simple control. They propose mixed parity commissions of representatives of the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to be joined perhaps also by others (that is to say, neutrals). What is interesting as well is the further proposal for the holding of periodic meetings of the powers which have their nuclear weapons stationed within the area — that is, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union — so that they could inform each other about the nuclear situation in their respective spheres of influence...

How far is Warsaw prepared to meet the West half-way is evident, finally, from the expression of readiness to take account

of the Western reservations concerning recognition of the G.D.R. — which would, after all, be a contracting party of the Gomulka Plan. The possibility is evidently contemplated to substitute unilateral declarations by the participants for a treaty signed by all the partners...

One final point: implementation of the Gomulka Plan would not so much hinder the creation of the multilateral atomic force (MLF) as to make the ships used by it avoid West German ports. This alone calls into question the claims made by NATO strategists as to the Gomulka Plan destroying the balance of power in Europe. The truth is quite simple: the West is not yet ready to risk the experiment proposed by Poland. But one cannot expect a more modest proposal, however great the difficulties involved even here, if one attempted to carry out Warsaw's plan. The point is, however, to make this attempt. Obviously, one needs for it a concept of eastern policy that is no longer in Adenauer's shadow.

This reasonable attitude was quite exceptional in the West German press, the prevailing tone being that of attack, derogation and innuendo.

Describing this generally negative German attitude, the Danish *Information* reported:

But, in spite of everything, there remains the impression that the German Federal Republic is acting unwisely and unnecessarily in adopting a negative attitude to any plan whatever of arms control in Europe. Irrespective of how unsubstantiated and unjust may be the charges of belligerence and aggressiveness laid against the Germans, the fact remains that the German Federal Republic is doing nothing to prove the peaceful intentions of her policies... Is it really a wise step on the part of Bonn that the Germans should be the first to turn down the Polish initiative... Would it not be better to tackle at last the problem of inspection and control, and see what the Poles and the U.S.S.R. are ready to concede...

All these suggestions and appeals to reason were but voices crying in the wilderness. At a meeting called in Hamburg on 13 March by the local organization for European Union, the Polish proposals were clearly and unequivocally turned down by the German Minister of Defence, Herr von Hassel, who thus, by backing the CDU's resolution on this subject, adopted as we know even before the memorandum had been made public, made an exception to the official attitude of "no comment on the Polish plan which is being carefully studied".

Herr von Hassel turned down every plan for reducing and freezing nuclear arms, every disengagement proposal, whether Gomułka's, Rapacki's or Wilson's — all of which he quoted in one breath, ignoring all the differences between them. He also expounded the theory that any such steps would only increase the degree of risk — a curious way of reasoning, which sees the risk involved in partial bilateral disarmament, but is impervious to the real danger of a continued nuclear arms race.

In accord with the official formula, Herr von Hassel's reasoning was based on the well-known tenet that such plans did not remove the main cause of tension — that is, division of Germany — and as long as tension continued, Central Europe must remain militarily "undiluted". This leads us straight into that blind alley which is the end of all polemics — in which causes get mixed with effects.

Briefly, this is how we view the logical sequence: one must begin by taking concrete, though perhaps limited, steps towards disarmament and easing tension and, having achieved détente, create conditions for a broader solution of the German problem. Beginning at the end will not bring us any

nearer to German reunification and, what is more, will prevent progress towards relaxation and ending the division of Europe. The formula used by Bonn is — whatever the appearances — not aimed at the Gomułka Plan or Mr Wilson's suggestions, but at any practical proposal for partial disarmament and easing of tension in Europe.

Alongside old doctrines and formulas, arguments of a novel kind are also being used and Bonn is exerting its pressure through other channels, less public than the press.

The attack develops on two fronts. One consists in unmasking the alleged hidden intentions of the Polish memorandum, the other in producing a maximum number of technical objections, military and strategic. The latter have the additional value of being arguments for the initiated, as regards which mere civilians can have no idea as to their substantial rightness or wrongness, since they are matters for small groups of experts to assess. Let it be added that objections of a purely military nature and isolated in form can always be raised against any disarmament proposal. The essential thing in this case is to analyze the effect the proposed steps would have on the military strength of both sides, and how they would affect the balance of power, to examine whether the military and political consequences are commensurate and to attempt to draft a joint balance-sheet which alone would be decisive. But this is precisely what the opponents of the Polish proposal have, so far, carefully avoided doing.

Here are some headlines in the West German press: *Stuttgarter Zeitung* of 6 March — "Polish Pitfall"; *Deutsche Zeitung* of 11 March — two articles entitled: "NATO Rejects Gomulka Plan" and "Dangerous Hopes"; *Münchner Merkur* of 11 March — "Adam Rapacki's Interlude"; *Kölnische Rundschau* of 21 March "Unacceptable Plan".

Werner von Lojewski's article in the *Kölnische Rundschau* dated 10 March is one of the unmasking series; it says of the Polish proposal:

> It is to be part of a wider offensive the aim of which is to create confusion in the Western camp, to weaken NATO and, in the first place, to lower the German Federal Republic's prestige in the eyes of her allies.

This is followed by somewhat doubtful compliments addressed to the adroitness of Polish diplomacy, and by the quite unexpected conclusion that the Polish Government is aiming at excluding the American nuclear force from the freeze zone. Last but not least, Herr von Lojewski divulges yet another scheme in the Gomułka Plan, which — he says — is nothing but an attempt to stabilize the division of Germany since it would lead to recognition of the "existence as a state and of the sovereignty of the Pankow regime".

A similar bitter-sweet tone as regards the cleverness of Polish diplomacy can be detected in the *Deutsche Zeitung* of 11 March:

> This Eastern bloc move on the chessboard has been, with at least certain allies, a partial success. There are voices in the Belgian NATO delegation which hold this sort of solution as worthy of consideration. From... our Scandinavian allies, who have equal voting rights in the NATO Permament Council, similar views may be heard.

And finally, the revelation of the real and diabolic intention of the Polish scheme — devised, indeed, to serve as an

> instrument to sow mistrust between the Federal Republic and her allies.

Another article in the same issue thunders at some nearer home:

There are still those in the Federal Republic who feel sympathetic towards the Rapacki Plan... It is believed at NATO headquarters that by way of the Polish proposals the Communists aim at achieving two objectives: first, to prevent nuclear weapons being delivered into the hands of the Bundeswehr; and secondly, to reduce the striking power of the U.S. Seventh Army stationed in South Germany...

The references to the American Seventh Army and to the "blow at the MLF" are two favourite arguments produced in strategic-political dissertations painstakingly attempting to prove the point that a freeze of nuclear arms at their present level would tip the scales of the balance of power in favour of the East, whereas setting up a multilateral force and continuing the build-up of nuclear arms by the West is the only way to maintain that balance. Since such reliable politicians as, for instance, Mr McNamara contend that the West already has a tactical and strategic nuclear superiority in Europe, reasoning of this kind seems too tortuous to be convincing.

BRACING UP THE ALLIES

However devious the arguments, German pressure and influence were not without effect, and the Federal Republic's manifest opposition to the Polish plan was soon partly rewarded. This could be observed not only in the "cautious comments" coming from "well-informed quarters", but also in press reports.

Reuter's correspondent, reporting on the military experts' first impresions on 9 March, summarized them as seeing far-reaching military and political implications which should be analyzed by the alliance as a whole, expressing doubt as to the means of subjecting the freeze to effective inter-

national control, and — last but not least — involving the general conclusion that no understanding should be reached that was unacceptable to the Bonn Government.

Which lands us back on well-trodden shores.

According to Drew Middleton, Paris correspondent of *The New York Times*, writing on 9 March, NATO's reaction to the Polish plan appeared to be "distinctly hostile" because the Atlantic Alliance was "suspicious of its motives". Among the objections raised was the allegation that the plan sought "to prevent a modernization or reinforcement of the alliance's tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany", and that the political aim was "to enhance the position of the East German Communist Government".

This is so typical and so well-known a record of charges and imputations that their very nature would have betrayed the source of inspiration of these objections and suspicions even had we been unaware of the power of West German influence on NATO military quarters in Paris.

Nor is this by any means an isolated view; Georges Andersen wrote in the Paris *Combat* of 10 March:

> Only a few hours after the Polish plan had been presented to journalists Konrad Adenauer called a press conference on 6 March in order to kill two birds with one stone. He condemned and rejected the concept of an atom-free zone as put forward by Mr Harold Wilson, the Labour Party leader, and the Polish plan. He even gave vent to a violent protest against the secret machinations "designed to degrade the German Federal Republic to the rank of a third- or fourth-class nation".

From then on, one could have foreseen that the attitude adopted by the NATO high quarters would follow a similar line.

Middleton's earlier quoted report on the moods prevailing in NATO was — as regards its tone and content — some-

thing of an exception in the Western press, excluding of course West German publications. We take note of it in order to show that we do not underrate the role and influence exercised by certain West German circles inside the Atlantic Alliance.

WHO SPEAKS TOO EAGERLY REVEALS TOO MUCH

To complete our record of opposing voices, let us cite passages from two characteristic articles carried by the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* of 6 March, under the respective titles: "Warsaw Wants to Isolate Bonn" and "Polish Pit-fall".

The first is a correspondent's dispatch from Vienna, deploring the effect achieved by Polish perfidy:

> The greatest success of the latest Polish effort appears to consist in that many competent politicians in the Western capitals may now become convinced of the seriousness, genuineness and "sincerity of the Polish will to peace" and come to the conclusion that the plan deserves constructive consideration. Warsaw is trying to bring nearer the time when Bonn will be outmanoeuvered into isolation. This would mean victory for Soviet Europe, without resort to armed force, but by a mere freezing of the nuclear force — victory, that is, over the Federal Republic.

Even more pointed concepts are contained in the "Polish Pit-fall" article:

> American policy has the choice of striving either for cohesion within the Alliance, relegating the improvement of American-Soviet relations to a secondary role, or for improvement of such relations at the expense of Western military cohesion.

This — let it be said — is an almost classical declaration of cold-war policy made from a position of strength, a declaration between the lines of which hints of blackmail may

be read. This is followed by a number of statements all the more interesting because they are made with a brutal frankness rarely encountered in the West German press:

> Washington... understands that West Germany cannot for long be shut out from the decisive nuclear force, and on the other hand it fears the possibility of autonomous Franco-German nuclear arms being developed. That is why it has advanced the idea of a multilateral nuclear force, which would give Germany participation in the Western nuclear programme without decisive rights as regards atomic weapons having been accorded to her. *Nevertheless the USA does not crush German hopes of achieving, in time, the absolute right to a say in matters concerning the nuclear programme* (my italics — K. M.).

This is the gist of the matter, put bluntly and clearly, though without direct bearing on the Polish plan, but rather on the NATO multilateral force and West German aspirations involved in it. Whenever the same thing has been said by members of the Socialist camp, when Poland has warned against this trend of developments, the immediate reaction has been to sound the alarm concerning "dissemination of mistrust", "disruption of the alliance", "vilification of the German Federal Republic", discrimination against it, and most recently, concerning threatening the Germans with being subjected to ignominious slavery.

Much the same thing has been said by Mr Wilson, and again there was anger, indignation and condemnation in reply. Ex-Chancellor Adenauer thundered at the Labour Party leader declaring that the man soon likely to assume the office of British Prime Minister had rendered an ill-service both to his country and to the free world.

On this occasion a warning against West German urges to become a nuclear power came from quarters ideologically above suspicion. That is what has made it worthwhile to draw attention to it in this political survey.

Encouraged by such precedents we take the liberty of quoting also a comment in the Paris *Combat* of 6 March:

> In their novel form, the Polish proposals... seriously attract the attention of Western countries, except for the Federal Republic to whom adoption of the the Gomulka Plan would *signify final renunciation of the possession of nuclear arms — a renunciation to which Bonn has only been paying light service* (my italies — K. M.).

POSITIVE REACTIONS TO THE GOMUŁKA PLAN

"The first effect of the [Polish] proposal", according to Carlyle Morgan writing in *The Christian Science Monitor* of 11 March, was that it divided "Western strategic political commentators into two camps". Since most of our attention so far has been directed to quotations from sources objecting to the Gomułka Plan — with one source and centre dominant among them — let us now, for a change, see what other opinions were proffered in the discussion. We shall not necessarily select them from the point of view of the approval or support they give to the Polish initiative, for such would be too many to quote, but shall rather judge them as contributions to broadening the argument and exploring the prospects opened up by the proposals. Note that, politically and geographically, the participants in this discussion were spread over a very wide area.

Il Giorno, organ of the progressive wing of the Italian Christian Democrats, wrote on 6 March:

> The present Polish plan, more modest than its predecessor, can the more easily count on attracting favourable attention... The object which Polish diplomacy has set out to achieve is the same: the setting-up in Central Europe of a zone where one may breathe freely... To this initiative the present time is more auspicious than

were earlier years, and the emergence of the Gomulka Plan comes at a more favourable moment.

And the conservative *Daily Mail* in London said on the same day:

> For the West this new modification of the Rapacki nuclear free zone tabled in 1958 has the added incentive of recognising the need for some inspection system... But the biggest obstacle at the moment to the plan is that it would probably rule out West Germany from the M.L.F. project.

The Danish conservative daily *Berlingske Tidende* on 9 March wrote that the Polish plan might be useful in the disarmament negotiations in Geneva.

In an editorial, the weekly *Century* of India on 14 March examined the plan and the objections it had already encountered, arriving at the following conclusions: it hoped that the Polish plan, if accepted, would help break the deadlock in the Geneva negotiations. The essence of the plan consisted in that West Germany should be included in the freeze zone. Should the West agree to it, it would mean a significant change, followed by a détente in the cold war.

The writers from whom quotations are cited above emphasized the aptness of the Polish plan and agreed that it had been submitted at the right and favourable moment.

The Christian Science Monitor in an editorial on 9 March wrote of the need to explore the new possibilities opened up by the Polish proposal:

> Might it not be worthwhile to seek out any common ground between United States and Polish thinking? To discover, for example, whether the Poles' aim is merely to preclude West German participation in a multilateral fleet? Or whether the freeze can be applied to other parts of the world? Such exploration would mean no risk to the West — and would be further proof of its good will.

A CHANCE TO PUT INSPECTION TO THE TEST

Several commentators drew attention to the possibilities and prospects the plan opened of putting to the test the concept and mechanism of control. In citing some of the more interesting observations on the necessity and possibility of setting up in the freeze zone a system of international control jointly agreed upon, it must be said that, strictly speaking, the concept is not so entirely novel as has sometimes been implied. The Rapacki Plan, which proposed the setting up — in two stages — of an atom-free zone in this same region, also emphasized the principle of international control. Polish leaders have repeatedly expressed the view that the principles, form and mechanism of such control should be agreed upon by the experts of the parties concerned in multilateral discussion. They pointed out that the experience gained in this field and region could be of great value in breaking the deadlock in the general discussion of the problem of control, and could perhaps be applied as a pilot scheme for geographically and substantially broader solutions.

Returning to this matter, *The Christian Science Monitor*, whose interest in the Polish proposal was reflected in a series of articles and matter-of-fact comments on the subject, printed a piece by Carlyle Morgan on 11 March:

> ...every Communist proposal that might open the door to further discussion of arms inspection holds out possibilities that the West must examine. Someday, perhaps in some apparently minor move by Soviet diplomacy, a real opportunity for removing the dangers of nuclear secrecy, of surprise attack, of hidden build-ups of the nuclear arsenal, may repose — to be ferreted out and developed by alert statesmanship.

The *Ottawa Citizen* in Canada wrote that the Polish initiative gave hope that, in spite of everything, further pro-

gress towards disarmament could be achieved and — elsewhere — that, should the principle of control be possible to apply, this would create a precedent of extraordinary significance to further progress.

The independent Norwegian *Morgenposten* said in an article by J. O. Johansen on 18 March:

> The new Polish plan is very realistic because, among other things, it puts forward concrete proposals concerning inspection... it is the first time a country belonging to the Eastern bloc has gone so far to meet the demands of the West in the matter of inspection ond control. This problem is indeed the key to any further disarmament steps...
>
> That we should have no great hope as to the possibility of the plan being implemented is due solely to the attitude adopted by West Germany. Washington and London, though their reaction to the Polish plan was more positive than ever before, cannot accept a plan to which Bonn objects.

And finally here is a passage from an editorial in *The New York Times* of 21-22 March:

> Poland's proposal... seems to involve a degree of inspection far beyond anything accepted by Russia heretofore...
>
> The West may find, as a result, that discussion of the Polish plan may help unblock the route to the more attractive surprise--attack scheme...

Here we find an idea already expressed in *The Times* editorial (see p. 34), to the effect that a successful practical experiment in the matter of control, put to the test in implementing the Polish proposal, could help to open a road to understanding in a matter so vital and in every aspect so ripe for settlement as an agreement on preventing surprise attacks.

In that same issue of *The New York Times* there was an interesting letter by Mr Homer A. Jack, Executive Director of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. He wrote in part:

> ...deep doubts about MLF persist, not only in the Communist world, but within NATO and apparently within our own Pentagon — and certainly among the American people...
>
> But is MLF or a European deterrent the only alternative in an era when the leaders of both major nuclear powers repeatedly point to the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Isn't a third alternative some means of freezing and then reversing the nuclear arms race in Central Europe?
>
> If progress can be made in this direction — and both Harold Wilson and the Polish Government have made new proposals toward this end — then both the MLF and the European deterrent can be abandoned being dangerous alternatives...
>
> The Soviet Union rightly fears a nuclear-armed West Germany and I believe the American people and the American Government fear such an eventuality also. An MLF even with an American veto, and especially without an American veto, would give the West Germans (or any great participating, non-nuclear power) increased appetite for nuclear weapons.

The liberal American daily *St. Louis Post Dispatch* argued on 16 March on very similar lines. It expressed the view that an armaments freeze could by no means upset the balance of power in Europe or endanger the security of the West, and emphasized the unique chance offered to general disarmament solutions by a testing of limited inspection in a limited area. The newspaper warned that objections would certainly be raised to the effect that a nuclear freeze in Central Europe would prevent the implementation of the American plan to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force with West German participation. Whatever the merits of those

objections, the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* said, the half-baked MLF project had so little true support among the NATO member countries, with General de Gaulle and the British Labour Party actively opposing it, that giving it up altogehter would be a small price to pay for an accommodation betewen East and West. The newspaper urged President Johnson to instruct the State Department to study the Polish plan seriously and sympathetically.

IS 1969 A CLOSE OR DISTANT FUTURE?

We should like to complete this selection of lengthy quotations by a passage from an article in *The Christian Science Monitor* of 24 March, written by Mario Rossi:

> Apprehension of a radical change in West Germany's policies after 1969 is said to have represented a determing cause in the decision by the Polish Government to present a new plan that aims at freezing the present military balance in Central Europe.
>
> Five years hence the North Atlantic Treaty expires — or will have to be renewed — and West Germany will become, technically at least, unattached from Western military arrangements based on NATO.
>
> The Poles are said to be concerned that at that time West Germany will feel free to take independent initiatives aiming at the reunification of the country and the reacquisition of territories incorporated into Poland after World War II.
>
> Should a new treaty be negotiated the Poles are reported to anticipate that Bonn will stake territorial claims as a price for joining.

Well, 1969 is remote, some might say, but others take a different view. Let us again revert to the already quoted dispatch by Roland Delcour, *Le Monde* correspondent in Bonn, reporting on former Chancellor Adenauer's speech at the

luncheon given in his honour on 6 March by representatives of the foreign press. The closing remarks read:

> Reverting to NATO [Dr Adenauer] declared himself to be a partisan of a deep-going reshaping of the Atlantic Organization, an occasion for which will be provided as the date 1969, when the treaty expires, draws nearer. He invited NATO members to be prepared in good time for this event "which would come sooner than some think".

A significant statement. Or was it a warning?

V. PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE

As time has gone by, the Polish proposal for a nuclear arms freeze has become a topic discussed in wider and wider circles, and at the same time it has been regarded as an almost indispensable element in the problem of security in Europe and in East-West relations.

This again has constituted *ex post* evidence of the topicality of the issue raised by Poland, of the vitality and popularity of the continued effort made by the Polish Government to ease tension, and of the fact that the Gomułka Plan stands as a pivot to the European problems, to security and to the fundamental problem of co-existence. It has also been evidence that the Polish proposal has touched a matter generally considered to be ready for settlement and demanding an early solution.

It was obvious at the time of the announcement of the Polish plan that before settling its final wording the Polish Government had in the first place consulted its allies in the Warsaw Pact on every aspect of its provisions, obtaining their consent and support. This fact was stated by Mr Rapacki during his press conference, when he answered a rather superfluous question put to him by a Western correspondent. However attractive and promising Poland's proposal might be, if put forward without the approval of her allies and, first

and foremost, without the consent of her powerful military partner — the U.S.S.R., such a proposal would be academic, not political, and would lack the basic quality of realism.

In the weeks that have followed, the initial approval and support have been confirmed not only in official press agency commentaries and editorials in leading newspapers, but also in official statements by representatives of Socialist countries, in state documents and declarations.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly, on several formal and public occasions, expressed its endorsement of the Polish plan. Similar declarations have been made by other policy-makers, Premiers or Foreign Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. Also the Yugoslav Government and President Tito have expressed their support for, and approval of, the initiative taken by Poland.

Implementation of the Gomułka Plan as a concrete step to be taken has been included in a number of statements and bilateral declarations signed on the occasion of visits and meetings, frequent during the period, between party leaders and heads of government of the Socialist states. As examples let us cite the Bulgarian-Hungarian declaration of 14 March 1964, the Soviet-Hungarian of 9 April, and the Polish-Soviet of 15 April, and the statements made by the Hungarian and German Democratic Republic Governments on 13 May, the Soviet and German Democratic Republic Governments on 13 June, the Polish and Yugoslav Governments on 2 July, the Polish and Hungarian Governments on 20 October and the Polish and Mongolian Governments on 28 October.

The declarations referred to certainly dealt with the broader aspects of the international situation, with the internal problems of the working-class movement, and with

problems arising from bilateral or multilateral co-operation among the Socialist countries, but they all found it appropriate in the paragraphs devoted to the international situation formally to endorse the Polish proposal.

Among these documents a particularly important place was taken by the German Democratic Republic Government's note addressed to the Polish Government and published on 12 May. It expressed full understanding of, and support for, the Polish memorandum and acceptance of the commitments resulting from the Polish plan, including those involving international control based on the general principles proposed. The note ended with the assurance that "the Government of the German Democratic Republic will do anything in its power to facilitate giving effect to this proposal"; that was greeted with understaandable approval in Poland, especially in view of the attitude adopted by the policy-makers of the other German state — the German Federal Republic.

IN THE NATO COUNTRIES

We have recorded these facts and declarations simply in order to complement the documentation, since they contained nothing unexpected, the matter having been the subject of prior consultations with countries which are bound to Poland by links of close co-operation and most of which are partners in the defensive treaty known as the Warsaw Pact.

The lines on which discussion of the Polish plan developed in the West, among others in the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, were interesting to follow but not so easy to foretell.

A number of these countries have given their formal

reply through diplomatic channels, and their notes have reflected an attitude agreed upon in principle within the Atlantic Alliance in consultations announced beforehand. Such replies more or less boiled down to stating the various obstacles and difficulties that would at present stand in the way of implementing the Polish proposal. But even these documents varied considerably in their estimates of the Polish intention and of the nature of the obstacles foreseen. Since these documents have not been published by the parties concerned (except an aide-mémoire of the Polish Government to the Federal German Government which will be examined later), we shall have to rely on other sources and record such voices in the discussion as we believe to be both reliable and illustrative of the official attitude.

Let it be said, in the first place, that in May and June the Gomułka Plan received a good deal of attention in the parliamentary discussions on foreign affairs in the Netherlands, Norway and Britain. It is no exaggeration to say that in all of these discussions the plan was regarded as being among the most topical issues.

It was also on the list of matters Mr Harold Wilson, then still Leader of the Opposition, and Mr Gordon Walker, then the Labour shadow Foreign Secretary, took with them to discuss in Moscow. It held a prominent place in the press reports on Mr Wilson's talks at the Kremlin and also after he had returned home.

It was reported to have been part also of the diplomatic brief Mr Butler took with him on his own trip to Moscow.

The Polish plan was an item on the agenda of the disarmament conference in Geneva.

Alongside the more extensive proposals tabled by Mr Wilson, the Polish plan was discussed at the meeting of the Socialist International held in London in the first half of

April. Both became the subject of serious controversy, which-ended inconclusively, between the German Social-Democrats and the British Labour Party.

One might say that the Polish proposals almost automat-ically emerged as a subject of discussion whenever and wherever discussion touched upon such matters as interna-tional politics, European security, disarmament, and East--West relations.

Where there was no formal parliamentary debate, the topic worked its way out into the open, cropping up in the press, in public statements made by politicians and in international conferences.

During the foreign affairs debate in the Dutch Parliament in the middle of June, representatives of the five main pol-itical parties took the floor to discuss the matter. There was a considerable divergence of views particularly in relation to the official formula, reflecting the Government's attitude, that all solutions of this sort should be linked with the question of German reunification (the source that inspir-ed this viewpoint being not difficult to guess). A Socialist deputy, Mr Ruygers, opposed the linking of these two questions and pointed to the nuclear test ban treaty success-fully concluded despite similar objections. Mr Bos, deputy of the Christian Historical Union, said that, although a discussion of disarmament and of the German problem were sometimes virtually inseparable, automatic insistence on discussing any arms limitation proposal only in the context of the German problem would be definitely harmful.

Even those deputies who expressed certain reservations — as, for instance, the Catholic deputy, Mr Mommersteeg — thought that the Polish plan deserved very careful considera-tion since it might serve as platform for a further exchange of views through diplomatic channels.

The foreign affairs debate in the Norwegian Storting took an interesting and rather unexpected turn. According to some commentators, it in fact transformed itself into a debate on the Polish proposal on the one hand, and the revisionist slogans propagated by Bonn on the other.

The latter point could hardly be called debatable since there was general condemnation of the revisionist claims pressed by West Germany. Where views differed was in the deploring by certain deputies of the total lack of realistic political thinking among the revenge-seekers — also reflected in the governmental attitude as regards the 1937 frontiers — while others indicated the danger of this sort of policy to security in Europe, to East-West relations, and, ultimately, to the Federal Republic herself.

The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Halvard Lange, said that, according to the Western view, German frontiers should be formally fixed under a peace treaty, but he also added:

> Realistically speaking, there are few who can imagine any factual changes in the situation involving the external borders of Germany established as a result of the Second World War.

The debate proper on the Gomułka Plan was opened by Mr Gustavsen, leader of the Socialist People's Party. He referred to Mr Lange's statement as regards there being an inclination towards disarmament in the world of today and to the readiness of the Norwegian Government, declared in the autumn of 1963, to make every effort towards easing tension, which they regarded as one of the principal aims. He said that the Polish proposal offered the Norwegian Government a very good opportunity, and that reservations made on earlier occasions in relation to proposals of wider range could hardly be applicable in this case. The plan did not in any

way upset the present balance of power, and proposed simple and realistic measures for applying the brake to the dangerous process of nuclear build-up in this part of Europe.

Replying, Mr Lange agreed that the Polish plan would not upset the present balance, but said the matter of control created certain difficulties — a view the Norwegian Government held in common with the governments of other Western countries. On the other hand, that Government did not share the other governments' remaining reservations, and in particular it did not hold with the theory that limited security measures must necessarily be taken only after the solution — or must be linked up with the solution — of the purely political problem of German reunification. "The foundation for solving the German problems", he added, "can only be laid by gradually easing tensions between East and West".

The Government's attitude in the matter of control was then criticized by Mr Garbo, leader of the Liberal "Venstre" Party, and by Mr Johansen, representative of the Labour Party now in power.

"When disarmament steps", said Mr Garbo, "were again and again rejected by the West on the grounds that the attitude of the Eastern bloc to control measures was negative, was that not perhaps a camouflage for yet other motives?", and he went on to ask whether regard for the attitude adopted by the German Federal Republic might not be the cause of present reservations. He also attacked the West German Minister Seebohm's statement on the Munich Agreement and recalled that, despite the sharp reaction of world opinion to that declaration, Chancellor Erhard had not deemed it necessary to ask for Herr Seebohm's resignation.

In winding up the debate, the Norwegian Foreign Minister again declared that his Government regarded the

Polish initiative as a valuable contribution which was being carefully studied, and that it had informed the Polish Government of its reservations and, at the same time, expressed a desire to keep in touch with Warsaw on the issue.

The final touch to the debate was given in an article by Mr Halvard Lange, published in the governmental *Arbeiderbladet* in June:

> There is complete unanimity, confirmed in UN resolutions, that all states desire general and total disarmament. But general disarmament assumes the existence of trust and mutual understanding between nations, which is still absent in our conflict-ridden world. That is why great interest should be shown in proposals for limited steps. In talks with its allies, the Norwegian Government has been suggesting for years that particular importance be attached to international agreements concerned with regional concepts. Move of this sort, providing for limitation of armaments, could stabilize situations in various parts of the world where potential enemies are neighbours.
>
> As regards Europe, Poland is the country which has shown more interest than any other since the war in regional disarmament steps. That is why the Norwegian Government has for long kept in touch with the Polish Government on this matter.

Examining the principles underlying the Rapacki Plan and the Gomułka Plan, Mr Lange commented that the idea of an atom-free zone in Central Europe "is something worth fighting for". And as to the latest Polish proposal:

> In my view, confirmed for that matter by public opinion, the Polish initiative is of a constructive nature. We quite approve of the basic point of departure of the plan — that it is easier to begin by preventing accumulation and stockpiling of nuclear arms than to bring genuine disarmament into effect at once. According to what I know of the problem, there are no decisive technical obstacles in the way of setting up effective control with a simultaneous ban on the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

And Mr Lange ended his article by reverting to the idea he had expressed in the pariamentary debate:

> As to Norway, this country is ready to continue acting in support of steps taken in the direction of limiting armaments and of mutual inspection of military activities in Europe. We continue to desire to keep in touch with the Polish Government on this matter, and express the hope that our efforts will lead to practical results.

LET EXCHANGES AND DISCUSSION CONTINUE

A similar attitude as regards maintaining diplomatic contacts and continuing talks on this subject was adopted by the then British Foreign Secretary, Mr R. A. Butler, during the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 16 June, when the Polish plan and the Labour Party's proposals concerning Central Europe were a continually recurring theme.

To define the respective standpoints, it is necessary to give a brief account of the Labour Party's attitude in this matter, especially since it has undergone a certain evolution over the past few months.

As already indicated, Mr Harold Wilson and other Labour spokesmen have repeatedly expressed support for the Polish plan, as they had earlier and formally endorsed the Rapacki Plan. Both the late Labour leader, Mr Hugh Gaitskell, and his successor, Mr Wilson, have often indicated what in their view were the commonly shared elements in the manner of political thinking and in the disarmament proposals tabled by their Party and by the Polish Government.

During the talks that preceded the visit of Mr Harold Wilson and Mr Gordon Walker to Moscow (Mr Gordon

Walker had also been in Warsaw), and after their return, it became apparent that the Labour Party were inclined to launch proposals wider in range than those contained in the Polish memorandum. Continuing to endorse the Gomułka Plan which they considered to be a valuable step in the right direction, the Labour Party suggested that the freeze should apply also to missiles and other delivery systems, and that the border of the freeze zone should be extended to cover perhaps Rumania and Hungary on the one side, and Denmark and Norway on the other. The Labour leaders seem also to have been considering the idea of linking the Polish plan with the scheme of setting up control posts to prevent surprise attacks.

Thus, the Labour Party's proposals go even further than the Polish, but so far they have not been tabled in an official document.

Although contemplating some more broadly-based security plan of their own, the Labour Party continue to consider that an agreement to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms and the Gomułka Plan offer the best chances for the conclusion of a further understanding between East and West. In this way the attitude of his party was defined during the June debate by Mr Gordon Walker.

After becoming Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government Mr Gordon Walker reiterated his Party's earlier views. In an interview for Terence Pritte of *The Guardian*, published on 19 October, he said his Government

> will take a serious look at the Gomulka plan for a nuclear freeze, so long as delivery systems as well as warheads are included in it.

Mr Gordon Walker regarded the Polish plan as offering

> a limited variant to some overall system of inspection.

To return to the June debate, Mr Butler said in his statement, mentioned earlier, that the Polish proposal had been "the subject of much careful study" by the British Government, but that there were "a number of difficulties in any attempt to limit within the main area of East-West confrontation the freedom of either side to dispose of its military resources as it wished, and problems of inspection would be considerable". However, Mr Butler said, his Government were ready to resume discussion with their allies and with the Polish Government.

The British attitude had led *The Economist*, on 16 May, to comment as follows:

> The British reply [to the Polish memorandum] sent on May 6th, was something less than a categorical rejection It dwelt on the Poles' failure to offer any convincing or practical proposals for the system of verification that they envisage in theory. In this respect, the reply implicitly invited the Poles to try again...
>
> The attraction of the plan, to those who genuinely want disarmament, is that it could mean a beginning of real verification... It is worth a good deal of diplomatic patience to keep that door ajar...

REPLY TO WEST GERMANY

Perhaps the devotion of space to these parliamentary debates has brought us a little nearer to understanding the arguments advanced in their notes by the governments concerned and has helped to clarify at least some of the points under discussion.

Let us now study an officially published document, one in a series of diplomatic texts exchanged in this connection — namely the aide-mémoire of the Polish Government addressed to the Government of the German Federal Republic. (See full text in Annex).

The preamble summarizes the charges made by the German Federal Government in its reply to the Polish memorandum. The German Federal Government maintained that the forces of the Warsaw Pact constituted a threat to members of NATO; that acceptance of the Polish proposal would upset the present balance unless the freeze-zone were extended to cover the western part of the Soviet Union's territory; that the Polish memorandum did not specify the system of verification which ought to be more effective; and, lastly, that any steps undertaken to increase security in Europe must be linked with progress towards German reunification.

In refuting these charges, the Polish Government replied that it did not share the view that implementation of the Gomułka Plan would upset the balance and, moreover, that a number of politicians and military experts in the West did not share it either. The Polish Government was prepared amply to substantiate its position during further discussion.

> In any case [read one passage of the aide-mémoire], the suggestion that a part of USSR territory should be included in the nuclear arms freeze-zone can find no justification either in arguments involving the balance of power or in political logic.
>
> It has indeed been the intention of the Polish Government to leave the details concerning membership, structure and methods of procedure of the control organs to be agreed upon in direct talks between the parties involved. Since the Federal Government has made no appropriate concrete proposal, the inevitable conclusion is that, in point of fact, the question of control is not fundamental to the Federal Government's reservations.

In the second part of the aide-mémoire what is perhaps the most characteristic feature of Bonn's reply is dealt with — a feature that distinguishes it among the many replies received, including the formally negative ones — its estimate of the overall political situation in the Europe of

today, and the thesis as regards the threat to European security presented by the member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In this connection, the Polish Government felt compelled to recall certain indisputable facts, not only those dating back to past decades, but first and foremost those resulting from the policies currently pursued by the German Federal Republic, such as: pressing forward with armaments, trying — by various means — to gain access to atomic weapons, raising territorial claims, and obstructing any initiative taken towards easing tension and disarmament, even when such proposals have not originated in a Socialist country.

In reply to the thesis making of progress on German reunification a preliminary condition for partial solutions, the aide-mémoire contained the following statement:

> The Polish Government is not isolated in its conviction that the solution to the problem of German reunification can result only from an evolutionary process. The atmosphere of the armaments race and of growing tension in Europe cannot be favourable to this process. Thus, the Federal Government is creating a vicious circle. Every constructive effort tending to heal the European situation can be paralyzed in this way. In the meantime, this situation, and particularly the continuing arms race, creates more and more new dangers.

The closing words read:

> The Government of the Polish People's Republic considers that, in the interests of peace and security in Europe, discussion on the Polish proposal for a nuclear arms freeze should, without delay, proceed to a businesslike exchange of views.

"A businesslike exchange of views" — seemingly a simple matter. In this case, however, a crucial question in the dilemma calls for an answer: are all the parties concerned intent on making further progress towards easing international tension, or are there some who fear and oppose such progress but, for opportunistic reasons, try to conceal their reluctance under a shield of more or less well-assembled arguments, in which a businesslike approach plays no leading part.

It is not possible to determine the attitude of individual countries or to take a single step further without resolving this question.

A few facts and statements may help us draw the correct conclusion.

On 19 June 1964 Chancellor Erhard held a press conference, his first after an interval of several months. Although he replied to only a dozen or so of the fifty questions submitted in writing, the answers he gave are well worth noting.

Replying to a question put to him by Welles Hangen, correspondent of the American NBC television network, the Chancellor reiterated his already known view that the freeze zone would upset the military balance in Europe. He said he was, in general, not a supporter of what was called "regional disarmament" and added that the boundaries of the freeze zone would have to be shifted further east; otherwise the German Federal Republic would be exposed to danger.

The Chancellor also repeated the formula concerning the easing of tension being possible to achieve only through reuniting Germany.

At the end of May 1964, the Federal Foreign Minister,

Dr Schröder, went to Norway on an official visit for talks with the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr Gerhardsen, and Foreign Minister, Mr Lange. In its commentary, the West German DPA underlined that, by contrast with the hostile reception given a few years earlier to the then Minister of Defence Herr Strauss, the atmosphere surrounding Dr Schröder on his visit in Norway was friendly. This was reported to be due to the "realistic line of Schröder's policy" and to the conviction that an "active reunification policy" did not exclude efforts towards a détente between East and West, which was one of the concerns of Norwegian policy.

Somewhat different aspects of the visit were emphasized by Emmerich, the Bonn correspondent of the Vienna *Die Presse* on 26 May. He wrote of the fear existing in Bonn that the neutralist ideas "rampant" in the Scandinavian countries might affect also the concept of an atom-free zone in Central Europe. Consequently, it was Dr Schröder's intention to clarify the German standpoint as regards a uniform Western defence strategy and the danger of a different line being taken by the Scandinavians.

On 22 April, the West German Minister of Defence, Herr Kai-Uwe von Hassel, spoke at the Evangelical Church Academy in Bad Boll. He had, on earlier occasions, ruled out "military dilution in Europe" which, he said, would "dangerously increase the risk". Now he delivered a lengthy speech which contained a passage devoted to the recent Polish proposal:

> There can be no doubt whatever that the implementation of, for instance, the Gomulka Plan would unilaterally weaken the defensive forces of NATO in a decisive area, would make the defence of Western Europe impossible and would thereby open to the Soviets a road to domination by force, hitherto barred by the Atlantic Alliance.

This strangely foreboding passage formed part of an elaborate dissertation on the merits of "real détente" by contrast with the "illusion" linked with "peaceful solutions" so tirelessly peddled by — who else of course? — Communist propaganda.

Herr von Hassel did not fail on this occasion once more to remind that Germany would have to be reunited before assent to any partial solutions could be given, and he deplored the "deafness" of the Federal Republic's allies to the German people's plea for self-determination.

CHAMPIONS OF THE COLD WAR

We have deliberately chosen, as a beginning, these statements by men in key positions in Dr Erhard's Cabinet, members of the "new team" allegedly engaged in helping the new Chancellor to explore the prospects of making a fresh start in Bonn's eastern policy after the closure of the Adenauer era.

Now let us listen to some other voices, making the same point with even greater clarity.

At about the time as Herr von Hassel was giving in Bad Boll his warning as to the danger of peaceful co-existence and appealing for watchfulness as regards illusions that were spreading also among "many capable and intelligent people in the West", Baron von Guttenberg, CDU politician of some notoriety, addressed a *Junge Union* meeting in Frankfurt-on-Main.

He declared quite bluntly that, for the CDU, there could be no end to the cold war so long as Germany remained divided, thereby translating the diplomatic formula concerning the conjunction existing between détente and German

reunification into a language of refreshing frankness and clarity. Co-existence — according to Baron von Guttenberg — was a policy to serve Communist ends in clever disguise; not a novel idea either, but very frankly put.

Much fuss was raised in the West German press over the interview President Johnson gave to the Munich *Quick* magazine, in which, referring to the talks he had had with Chancellor Erhard, the President said he had told the Chancellor of the real and not entirely unfounded concern of the Russians over the German problem, and had appealed for efforts to allay their fear, and improve relations with the Soviet Union.

This provoked a veritable storm. Indignant voices were raised reprimanding the President for having publicly given advice to a head of government of an allied state and for providing material for Communist propaganda. Some deemed it necessary to remind the American President that the Federal Republic was not a U.S. satellite.

This vividly recalled the lessons Chancellor Adenauer, in his time, repeatedly read to President Kennedy on how to look after the business and security of "the free world and democracy". In much the same mood, the ex-Chancellor had only recently reprimanded Mr Wilson for an "ill-service" rendered the British people.

Another, and very angry, rebuke was administered to Mr Wilson by the *Kölnische Rundschau* on 10 June 1964.

Reporting on the Labour Party leader's visit to Moscow, the newspaper said that Mr Wilson had endorsed the Rapacki Plan and Mr Gomułka's proposals for an atom-free zone in Central Europe, and, at a press conference at the Kremlin, had failed to show much enthusiasm over the presence of Bundeswehr troops on British training fields. The *Kölnische Rundschau* was clearly alarmed by the

prospect of the steering wheel of British foreign policy being shortly taken over by Mr Wilson and Mr Gordon Walker, and it appealed to the Social Democratic Party to make a clear statement on "whether they did or did not endorse the stupid and dangerous policy of the Labour Party" and to exert appropriate pressure on the British. The article ended in this cry of anguish:

> Indeed, it would really be the last straw for free Europe to see Downing Street pursue a foreign policy steadily propagated by those fliers of Soviet kites — Rapacki and Gomulka.

HAVE WE CONCOCTED ANY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S CLAIMS?

To fill up the political background it is perhaps worthwhile to remind the reader of the position taken by several leading West German politicians in so vital a matter as territorial claims. There has been much complaining from Bonn about Communist — and in particular Polish — propagandist allegations as regards revenge-seeking trends being nurtured by the Federal Government and other West German politicians, as regards their cultivating and openly inciting to revisionism. There has been vigorous denial of the existence of any such moods, trends and claims; it has been asserted that, on the contrary, the Federal Government have repeatedly and solemnly declared they would never use force to achieve their ends.

For the time being let us pass over the manifest contradiction in saying in one breath that one has never raised territorial claims and also renouncing the use of force to realize them.

Instead, let us take stock of some of the things said in this matter over a period of less than three months.

To begin with — Chancellor Erhard who, on taking office, did not spare hints that he intended to explore every possibility of achieving understanding and would take a new line in eastern policy. Against this background, the speech he delivered in Bonn on 22 March 1964, addressing a congress of West German resettlers' associations, sounded, to say the least, peculiar. He expounded the view that any understanding with the peoples of Eastern Europe should be based upon a cardinal and just law of history:

> We certainly do not make any claims on the territory of other states' [he said]. But we do not renounce, and in view of the responsibility to the German nation, to law and to history, we cannot renounce, areas which are the rightful homeland of so many of our brothers and sisters... Peace and law are indivisible. Law cannot apply to only one specific group of nations, it must apply to all. The expulsion of millions of Germans from what had for centuries been their original homeland did not create any new reality under law. Law can never arise out of lawlessness.

This is indeed a most strange way of substantiating assertions that one did not dream of raising territorial claims, being entirely bent on seeking understanding with the peoples of Eastern Europe.

While Chancellor Erhard vindicated Germany's "legal and historic" rights to the 1937 borders, some of his colleagues in office went even further. Herr Seebohm's performance at the Nuremberg rally of resettlers from the Sudetenland was sensational even by Bonn standards. The West German Minister of Transport declared at a press conference on 13 May that one could not deny the former Sudeten Germans their right of self-determination, and that there were no legal grounds for not recognizing the German borders as they had been established under the Munich Agreement. This open endosement of the annexation of Czechoslovak territory by Hitler provoked a stormy reaction

in the world press and was criticized also by a number of respectable West German papers. Herr Seebohm's speech was attacked from many angles both for its content and for the speaker's want of tact. His blunder — it was feared — would provide arguments for "the campaign of slander" against the Federal Republic and might compromise the self-determination slogan.

We in Poland have long seen through this slogan, a handy instrument in the hands of revenge-seeking and revisionist politicians accustomed to misleading Western opinion, and we have often warned against taking the Bonn version of the "right of self-determination" at its face value.

A number of responsible and well-informed newspapers — including *The Washington Post*, *The Times* and *The Economist* — said quite bluntly that the only course for Chancellor Erhard after what had happened was immediately to dismiss Herr Seebohm from office which, incidentally, he had held longer than any of his cabinet colleagues. This the Chancellor did not do and Government spokesmen explained that the Minister had spoken not in his capacity as Minister and member of the Government, but as a private individual expounding his private views.

Briefly, this was not unlike a new impersonation of R. L. Stevenson's Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and not a bad way out of an uncomfortable position. But neighbours should be warned that the law-abiding and highly respected Dr Jekyll may one day again assume his alias and become a danger to his environment.

"THE VITAL INTEREST OF A GREAT POWER"

Let us now devote a few words to the increased activity of the former West German Minister of Defence, Herr Franz-

-Josef Strauss. Being a former Minister does not mean he is a "former" politician; on the contrary, he now holds a key position in the CDU/CSU coalition, nourishes great ambitions and is very active both in the Bundestag and elsewhere.

On a visit to the United States in June Herr Strauss was received by high-ranking politicians and delivered a number of pronouncements.

But even before setting out for America, he embarrassed Western policy-makers by launching a theory to the effect that it was now time to cease placing the burden of responsibility for the Second World War on Hitler and the Third Reich, since what Hitler had wanted was no more than war with Poland.

After returning from the United States, Herr Strauss published an article in the CSU organ *Bayern-Kurier* in which he said he had told Washington politicians bluntly and clearly that not only West Germany but also Germany reunited "would use all political means to fight for restitution of the 1937 borders". Rudolf Augstein, editor-in-chief of *Der Sipegel*, remarked in this connection that, although the article virtually amounted to being an official report by a party leader controlling 50 seats in the Bundestag,

> nobody protested against this attitude — no professor, or cleric, or journalist, and, of course, no party politician.

And here is another sample of Herr Strauss' style and way of reasoning taken from this same article:

> The rightful and vital interests of a great nation, the major part of which — the Federal Republic — holds the third place in the world economy, after America and the U.S.S.R., and second in the free part of the world, cannot simply be set aside and violated.

The phrase "rightful and vital interests", the reference to the economic and political position already achieved by the German Federal Republic, and the declaration as regards using "all political means to fight for restitution of the 1937 borders" combine to make a sufficiently expressive whole.

In no way surprised by it, we shall again turn to Rudolf Augstein for his comment:

> Since other political parties will not oppose the demagogy of the CSU leader, and Chancellor Erhard will only, as usual, keep mum, we shall have lived to see how, nearly twenty years after the defeat of Hitler — the Federal Republic takes a verbal course on war. The revision of frontiers which Strauss wants to achieve is impossible without war. So, under the slogan of "rightful and vital interests", is everything to begin again...?

How then, Augstein asks with understandable irony, can West Germans take offence when they are called revisionists and revenge-seekers by the Communists?

This last quotation will serve as partial explanation for our lengthy digression from the main topic, the Gomułka Plan, to a wider political background for the discussions on the Polish proposal. Seen against this background, Chancellor Erhard's delicate hints at a "historic right to the 1937 borders" and the pressures exerted by the Government of the German Federal Republic against acceptance of the Polish proposals assume particular significance.

We view West German policy not only from an angle of immediate interest to Poland, including its attitude to the Oder-Neisse border or to the Polish proposals for easing tension, and establishing normal relations with the Socialist countries.

We view the Federal Government's activities and the political line it takes from a wider angle, from the angle of European security, of tension eased throughout the world, of understanding between East and West, and of prospects of peaceful co-existence.

We concede that by various means and methods at different stages the Federal Government has built up West Germany's economic, political and military power. This in itself would hardly be exceptionable, were it not for the fear that this incontestably growing power may be abused to achieve expansionist, nationalist, and chauvinist ends. One of the elements of this growing power — the military potential — is as yet under control within the framework of "integrated NATO forces", but other alternatives called "European" forces are already emerging. Another essential factor in this respect is the increasingly manifest urge of the German Federal Republic to obtain access to, and participate in, disposition of the nuclear potential and armoury of the West. One of the means to achieve this end, and the easiest under present circumstances, is by admitting West Germany into the NATO multilateral force — a concept as dangerous in our view as it is controversial to some NATO members. We do not share the optimistic view expressed in American official comments that this is the most effective — or, as some will have it, the only — practical way of preventing the West Germans from developing a nuclear potential of their own. We think it is a line not unlike what the French call "Gribouille's policy", after a popular character known to have avoided being rain-soaked by jumping into a pond.

Our, not unsubstantiated, view of the overall policies pursued by the German Federal Republic leads us to declare

that the role it has for years been playing on the international scene has been destructive, reactionary, conducive to cold war, sabotaging détente in any form, and opposing every attempt at reaching even partial agreements between East and West. At various points various methods have been used against co-existence, against solving problems ripe for settlement and, indeed, against the very prospect of negotiation.

Slogans concerning German reunification, defending the interests of the "free world", the right to self-determination — all these are no more than pawns in a game the aims of which remain unchanged. To the German Federal Republic, détente is not only a "dangerous pit-fall" or "an illusion of the naïve"; it also stands in the way of her most egoistical interests — building up her military power or urging the achievement of purely nationalistic aims, much more difficult to justify under conditions of détente and co-existence than during cold war tension. The German Federal Republic does realize that in the present world situation, where the decisive military potential is *de facto* in the hands of only two nuclear powers, no state of secondary rank, even be it as prosperous as the Federal Republic, could dare risk on its own a showdown with the Socialist camp. Some people are confident that this fact is a sufficient safeguard against any adventurous attempts or steps by West Germany. Nevertheless, there is also the danger that, before being able to go it alone, one of the partners might insinuate himself into a position of such strength within the alliance as to make it an instrument to serve his own ends. And in any case he can paralyze the activities of his bloc and obstruct the road to improving the general situation.

There is factual evidence as to the Bonn Government being very active, enterprising and full of initiative, but

exclusively in one definite direction — namely, in propping up fences which divide Europe and the world, in pressing forward the arms race — allegedly to "increase the defence potential" — in manifesting a spirit of intransigence — purported to serve "the interests of the West and the free world". It has always been ready to build up the Bundeswehr, while other countries were reluctant to increase their conventional forces; it has eagerly accepted nuclear missile bases, when the Scandinavian countries would have none; it has also given its enthusiastic support to the MLF project — the only government to do so unreservedly. It has moreover declared itself willing and ready to bear 40 per cent of the heavy cost involved.

This same Government remains quite passive, or is deliberately awkward, when action is taken in an opposite direction: it is not known to have taken any initiative whatever towards easing tension, disarmament, allaying fear and prejudice.

What is more, in the face of the growing tide for détente and of stronger currents towards co-existence, the position adopted by the German Federal Government places it frequently in open conflict with its allies. This happens every time a new initiative is taken, and when new prospects open for rapprochement and negotiation.

On every such occasion, Bonn mounts a new attack, deploys arguments "against", unmasks "snares", multiplies doubts and warns the "naïve". Believe it or not, when President Kennedy was starting his talks with the U.S.S.R., when Mr Macmillan went to Moscow, when Mr Eden made his suggestions, as President Johnson and Mr Wilson are making theirs now — they all either operated under an illusion or were strangely negligent of the strength and cohesion of the West, while Bonn and Bonn alone saw the writing on the wall!

The wider political background gives us a better insight into the activities of openly revenge-seeking and militarist circles in West Germany, but also, and perhaps above all, into the policies of the Federal Government.

Discussion on the Polish plan has become a sort of litmus paper test of political attitudes, trends and aims. What is important is not only formal acceptance or rejection, but also the selection of arguments used in rejecting the Polish proposals and falsifying their underlying intention. What is greatly important is the tone introduced and the atmosphere created in this discussion by West Germany.

We do not want the picture we form of that country, so resilient, industrious and endowed with so many pacific qualities, to be all black. We listen scrupulously to voices demanding a change in the present line of policy and acceptance of the consequences of a war caused, unleashed and lost by Germany. We listen with sympathy and approval to courageous and honest voices condemning the dangerous revival in West Germany of chauvinism, militarism and political megalomania. We are all expectancy, waiting for "the new line in Eastern policy" so often announced in Bonn, and are deeply interested in every appeal for reconciliation and understanding.

But we must repeat that, so far, these appeals and announcements have been nothing but words. The new voices and currents do not yet influence Bonn's practical moves.

By saying "no" to the Gomułka Plan, the German Federal Government has again opposed a realistic attempt at improving the European situation and has again exercised its obstructive and destructive influence on its allies.

VI. THE DEBATE CONTINUES

And yet the ball keeps rolling and the discussion is kept going even by those governments who have formally rejected the Polish proposals. Despite everything, the Gomułka Plan is still on the agenda and remains at this crucial period in international relations one of the most vitally important political projects.

Poland wants the debate to continue in its most matter--of-fact and effective form, through all possible channels and on every accessible platform — this we have said before and we say it again.

Should anyone still have doubts about the balance of power remaining intact, or show genuine and constructive concern over the control problem, demanding that its form and method be specified, or should anyone desire to submit additional proposals or anly to sound out the possibility of submitting them — the way is wide open.

Such preliminary exchanges of views and opinions, conducive to clearing the ground and preparing a path for the understanding proposed by Poland, should be continued by all available means.

The conclusion of an understanding which would call the nuclear arms race to a halt in this part of the world, and reduce local tension, could have far-reaching and most desir-

able consequences. We know from experience that the political, moral and psychological effects of even limited and partial agreements may carry considerably greater momentum than is involved in the content of the agreement. To those who pursue peace by realistic negotiation, such agreements may add vigour and stimulus, may arm them with arguments, while undermining the position of those who, often through blindness, prefer to be intransigent cold-war crusaders, positions-of-strength politicians, blackmailers, or outright adventurers.

The general situation in the world today, the growing conviction that in the nuclear age co-existence and co-operation are the only way to avoid involvement in a war unprecedented and unrepeatable, the symptoms of realistic thinking, political sobriety, common sense and good will that multiply every day — all this permits us to hope that the Polish proposal, too, limited but essential and timely, may have a future.

ANNEX

Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the Freezing of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Armaments in Central Europe, 29 February 1964

The Government of the Polish People's Republic has already on numerous occasions manifested its consistent desire in the search for solutions aimed at bringing about international détente and disarmament and lent its support to all constructive proposals designed to achieve this end. The reduction of international tension and creation of conditions of security in Central Europe have always been and continue to be matters of particular concern to the Polish Government. This objective can and should be achieved above all by way of arresting the armaments race in this part of the world.

With this in mind the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented some time ago a plan for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe which, as is known, aroused the interest of numerous states and of world public opinion. In the view of the Polish Government that plan continues to be fully topical.

The Polish Government believes that there are at the present time suitable conditions for undertaking immediate measures the implementation of which could facilitate further steps leading to a détente, to a strengthening of security and to progress in the field of disarmament.

Basing itself on these premises the Government of the Polish People's Republic is submitting a proposal to freeze nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe. The implementation of such a proposal would be of particular significance to the security both of Poland and of all countries of this region as well as of the whole of Europe, since, while in no way affecting the existing relation of forces, it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race.

I. The Polish Government proposes that the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments include in principle the territories of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with the respective territorial waters and air space.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic sees the possibility of extending that area through the accession of other European states.

II. The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and delivery.

III. Parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the proposed freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

IV. To ensure the implementation of those obligations an appropriate system of supervision and safeguards should be established.

The supervision over the implementation of the obligation not to produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons covered

by the freeze would be exercised in plants which are or could be used for such production.

To ensure the implementation of other obligations control would be established to be exercised in accordance with an agreed procedure in proper frontier railway, road and water-way junctions, sea- and air-ports.

The supervision and control could be exercised by mixed commissions composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of the North Atlantic Treaty on a parity basis. Those commissions could be enlarged to include also representatives of other states. The composition, structure and procedure of the control organs will be subject of detailed arrangements.

Parties whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the armaments freeze and which have at their disposal nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would exchange, at periodical meetings of their representatives, all information and reports indispensable for the implementation of the obligations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments.

V. Provisions relating to the implementation of the proposal submitted above should be embodied in appropriate documents.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to enter into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties to reach an agreement on the implementation of these objectives.

The Polish Government will give due atention to all constructive suggestions, which would be in accordance with the objectives of the present proposal and would aim at the freezing of armaments in Central Europe.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic expects a favourable attitude to the proposal submitted hereby.

Statement by the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr Rapacki, at a Press Conference in Warsaw, 5 March 1964

The Polish Foreign Minister opened the press conference with the following statement:

"Gentlemen, as you may well recall, in an address delivered in Płock in December 1963, Władysław Gomułka put forward a proposal concerning a nuclear arms freeze in Central Europe. The present memorandum of the Polish Government enlarges upon that proposal to a degree deemed advisable so as to make the document the point of departure for constructive negotiations between the parties concerned.

"The proposal is the result of consistent efforts made by Poland to put developments in Central Europe on a path leading to eased tension, disarmament and mutual security. We are convinced that this would have tremendous significance for the consolidation of peace the world over.

"The Socialist countries have put forward many proposals with this end in view. Poland, too, submitted such proposals — let me mention only the plan for an atom-free zone in Central Europe.

"We continue to regard these proposals as topical. We consider, nevertheless, that — while waiting for favourable results — it would be unreasonable to stand passively by and watch the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, in a region of the world whose importance to the future of peace can scarcely be over-rated.

"At present, when it seems probable that agreement may be reached on a number of issues in the near or more distant future, it is extremely important that the nuclear arms race in Central Europe should be halted. If we fail to do so, the situation will grow more complicated and will make agreement more difficult. However, if we succeed, we shall con-

tribute to progress in the effort towards a peaceful development of the situation in Europe. That is the aim of Władysław Gomułka's proposal. We want to reach this goal by the straightest route possible.

"We trust that the parties concerned will take a serious and constructive attitude to the Polish proposal, that they will undertake serious and constructive negotiations".

Replying to questions from Polish and foreign correspondents, Mr Rapacki explained the substance of Poland's proposal and a number of aspects of the Polish Government's Memorandum. The following is a selection from his replies.

Aims and Intentions. The aim of the plan was to freeze nuclear arms in Central Europe at the present level. The objective of the Polish proposal was to bring about an easing of tension in the international situation. The implementation of the plan would mark an important step towards disarmament.

Balance of Power. "The objections forthcoming from the West", the Foreign Minister said in reply to a question, "allege that the denuclearization of Central Europe would disturb the existing balance of power. We did not, and do not, see grounds for this sort of objection. The proposal now submitted makes it obvious that its aim is not to disturb the so-called balance of power".

Control of the Implementation of the Nuclear-Freeze Plan. In reply to a number of questions, Mr Rapacki said that the Polish Government was prepared to discuss the problem in detail with the parties concerned.

The Minister added: "We would like to reach our objective by the simplest methods possible and we should not like to get bogged down in endless technical discussions on

control". He also expressed the opinion that it would be easier to control the freezing of nuclear warheads than that of the delivery means of weapons of mass destruction.

Consultations with Other States. The draft of the Memorandum had been discussed not only with Poland's allies but also with the interested Western countries. The Socialist countries had given their full endorsement to the Polish proposal. As far as plans for the immediate future were concerned, it was the Polish Government's desire that its plan should become the subject of detailed negotiations between the parties concerned.

Role of Medium and Small Countries. The implementation of disarmament plans depended primarily on the great powers. Even so, the Polish Foreign Minister pointed out, medium and small countries were able to do a great deal to promote relaxation and disarmament.

German Problem. Some foreign correspondents brought up the question of the German Democratic Republic. In reply, the Minister stated that Poland considered recognition of the existence of the German Democratic Republic and respect of her sovereign rights as one of the fundamental conditions of the peaceful development of the situation in Central Europe.

Mr Rapacki then pointed out that the aim of Mr Gomułka's proposal was clearly stated in the Memorandum, and that the plan did not set out to provide solutions to all the major international issues.

Multilateral Nuclear Force. In reply to one of the questions concerning the projected establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the Minister said: "This would be yet another serious stage in the nuclear arms race in Central Europe. Our stand on that project is known and

consistent. We felt, and we still feel, that this type of force should not be established".

Kekkonen Plan. One of the correspondents touched upon the visit of the President of Finland to Poland and asked about Poland's attitude to the proposal to create an atom--free zone in the Scandinavian countries.

"Poland is interested in President Kekkonen's proposal", the Polish Foreign Minister said. "Similarly, Poland is interested in other proposals which by various paths lead to the transformation of danger areas along the line dividing the two opposing military groups into zones of security. Also the present Polish proposal is a step in that direction".

Negotiations on the Plan. "We are prepared to begin negotiations on the proposal advanced by Władysław Gomułka", the Foreign Minister declared. "Every form of negotiation is acceptable to us. The length of these negotiations will not depend on us. We should like to contribute to halting the arms race in Central Europe and to facilitate the implementation of any constructive proposals, leading to a détente and to disarmament".

Note from the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Government of the Polish People's Republic, 15 April 1964

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has the honour of presenting the following communication to the Government of the Polish People's Republic:

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has acknowledged with vivid interest, and has carefully studied, the memorandum submitted to it on freezing nuclear armaments in Central Europe. It shares the view of the Government of the Polish People's Republic that the present inter-

national situation necessitates practical steps towards relaxation and safeguarding security. The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers the proposals advanced by the Government of the Polish People's Republic as one of such steps. The Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes and endorses the initiative taken by the Government of the Polish People's Republic. The German Democratic Republic is ready to participate in the proposed nuclear armaments freeze zone and to assume the indispensable commitments within the framework of appropriate agreements. The Government of the German Democratic Republic concurs with the Government of the Polish People's Republic that fulfilment of the commitments assumed should be secured by an effective control system. It expresses consent to the principles of such a control system as envisaged in the memorandum of the Polish People's Republic.

In the face of the revanchist policies pursued by the Government of the West German Federal Republic and of that Government's efforts to obtain control over nuclear arms within the NATO multilateral nuclear force, the Government of the German Democratic Republic attaches particular importance to the initiative taken by the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic shares the view, repeatedly expressed by the Government of the Polish People's Republic, that the inclusion of West Germany in the NATO multilateral nuclear force would be a major step towards increasing the danger of war and would considerably postpone a stabilization and normalization of the situation in Europe.

Interpreting every détente proposal as a danger to its policy of revenge and its nuclear armament schemes, the

Government of the West German Federal Republic has turned down also the proposal of the Polish People's Republic to freeze nuclear armaments in Central Europe. It has once again shown itself to be hostile to any kind of understanding and has, at the same time, confirmed that it is striving for participation in control over nuclear weapons and that it regards this as a decisive step towards gaining independent control of such weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic regards it as a prerequisite for the preservation of national existence to repel step by step the danger of nuclear war in Central Europe. Implementation of the proposal of the Government of the Polish People's Republic to freeze nuclear armaments in Central Europe would constitute a step in this direction.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic will do all in its power to facilitate, on its part, giving effect to this proposal.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic takes this opportunity to assure the Government of the Polish People's Republic of its deepest respect.

Aide-mémoire from the Government of the Polish People's Republic to the Government of the German Federal Republic, 1 June 1964

The Government of the Polish People's Republic does not share the view held by the Government of the German Federal Republic that implementation of the Polish plan [for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe] could upset the balance of power. This is a charge unjustified either in the light of an objective assessment of the world situation as it is today or in the light of the views expressed by Western

statesmen and experts. The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to expound its standpoint on the matter during further discussion concerning the Polish proposal.

In any case suggestion that a part of U.S.S.R. territory should be included in the nuclear arms freeze-zone can find no justification either in arguments involving the balance of power or in political logic.

The assertion by the Government of the German Federal Republic about the ineffectiveness of the means of control proposed is unintelligible in view of the statement made by the Federal Government itself that the Polish Government's memorandum contained no detailed elaboration of these means. It has indeed been the intention of the Polish Government to leave the details concerning membership, structure and methods of procedure of the control organs to be agreed upon in direct talks by the parties involved. Since the Federal Government has made no appropriate concrete proposals, the inevitable conclusion is that, in point of fact, also the question of control is not fundamental to the Federal Government's reservations.

Instead, in its reply, the Federal Government raises some political problems which, supposedly, stand in the way of the Polish proposals being brought into effect.

In proposing to check the nuclear armaments race in Central Europe, the Government of the Polish People's Republic was guided by its striving towards international relaxation and the creation of conditions for security in Central Europe. The Polish Government has a well-defined view as to the source of the present tension and as to who constitutes a threat to European security, and has expressed this view repeatedly. Nevertheless, for the sake of constructive discussion, the Government of the Polish People's

Republic did not consider it purposeful to raise this matter in its memorandum. However, since the Federal Government has deemed it proper to advance a theory, supported neither by history nor by present-day facts, about the threat to European security presented by the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Government is compelled to recall once more certain indisputable facts.

The nations of Europe have a vivid memory of the experiences of past decades. In the light of these experiences, the greater anxiety must be evoked by the policies pursued by the Federal Government — policies consisting in pressing forward with armaments, trying by various means to obtain control over nuclear arms and launching strategic theories corresponding to these aspirations, and, at the same time, in raising territorial claims and rejecting and obstructing the implementation of initiatives aimed at relaxation and disarmament — and not only such as originated in the Socialist countries.

As is also implied in its reply, the Government of the German Federal Republic makes its attitude towards partial solutions and towards the Polish proposal dependent on the fulfilment of preliminary political conditions, and in particular on problems bearing on the reunification of Germany.

The Polish Government is not isolated in its conviction that the solution to the problem of German reunification can result only from an evolutionary process. The atmosphere of the armaments race and growing tension in Europe cannot be favourable to this process. Thus, the Federal Government is creating a vicious circle. Every constructive effort tending to heal the European situation can be paralyzed in this way. In the meantime, this situation, and particularly the continuing arms race, create more and more new dangers.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic considers that, in the interests of peace and security in Europe, discussion on the Polish proposal for a nuclear arms freeze should without delay proceed to a businesslike exchange of views.

It has been the general line of Polish foreign policy, as repeatedly stated in official declarations and also pursued in political practice, to support every measure undertaken to improve international relations, to damp down sources and stimulants of tension and thereby to reduce the risk and threat of new armed conflict.

General and total disarmament has always been and still is the ultimate aim, the only means of securing a world free of war.

(page 11)

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